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Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya:
Will the New Constitution Enhance
Government Accountability?
MIGAI AKECH*
ABSTRACT
This article suggests that corruption in the Kenyan government is
largely an institutional problem, rather than a cultural one. It attributes
such corruption to the predominance of arbitrary power, especially in the
statutory (as opposed to constitutional) order. The statutory order grants
executive, legislative, and judicial actors broad powers without
establishing effective procedural mechanisms to circumscribe their
exercise. In the absence of effective regulation, law often aids the abuse of
power and corruption. Although the new constitution establishes
principles and mechanisms that may enhance government
accountability, the statutory order must be aligned with the values and
principles of this new constitution if abuse of power and corruption are to
be curbed.
INTRODUCTION
Kenya has made significant strides toward realizing meaningful
democracy since the inception of reform initiatives in the early 1990s.
As a result of these democratization initiatives, the powers of the
executive have been curtailed, and the legislature and the judiciary now
enjoy considerable autonomy.' Despite these significant gains, abuse of
power and government corruption continue to thrive. As this article will
show, the subversion of the electoral process that led to the outbreak of
violence following the results of the highly contentious presidential
* Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Nairobi, Kenya. This article is the
product of a Reagan-Fascell research fellowship at the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED), October 2009-February 2010. I am grateful to the NED for research
support. The views expressed in the article are my own, and do not necessarily reflect
those of the NED or its staff.
1. See infra Part III.
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election of December 2007 can partly be attributed to abuse of power.2
Far from abating, corruption seems to be increasing, as is clearly
demonstrated by the recent scandals involving the importation of maize3
and oil4 and the embezzlement of the free primary education fund.5
In addition, abuse of power and corruption are no longer solely
attributable to the executive. There are widespread and credible
allegations that the legislature and the judiciary are also abusing their
powers and engaging in, or facilitating, corruption.6 These allegations
have led to questions about the ability and legitimacy of these branches
to hold the executive to account. For example, there is a perception that
legislators are no less corrupt than the executive actors they purport to
hold accountable.7 Further, the legislature's ability to function as a
watchdog is compromised because some of its key committees are
headed by legislators who have been implicated in corruption scandals.
There are also concerns that legislators are influenced by special
interests and may not be credible guardians of the public interest.
The judiciary is equally culpable. Due to allegations of abuse of
power and corruption, significant segments of the citizenry perceive the
judiciary as having lost its legitimacy as a dispute resolution forum. For
example, the breakdown of law and order in the aftermath of the results
2. Kenya descended into anarchy on December 30, 2007, after the Electoral
Commission announced the results of the presidential election. Supporters of the Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM) took to the streets in violent protest against the Electoral
Commission of Kenya's declaration of President Mwai Kibaki as the winner of the
presidential election. For all intents and purposes, state authority consequently collapsed
in the political strongholds of the ODM. In many cases, the supporters of the ODM
maimed and killed the supporters of President Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU).
The supporters of the PNU responded in kind, and likewise maimed and killed ODM
supporters living in their midst. In a bid to contain this orgy of violence, the government's
security forces responded with great brutality. It is estimated that over 1,000 people died
and 300,000 people were displaced from their homes as a result of the post-election
violence.
3. See AFR. CTR. FOR OPEN GOVERNANCE, THE MAIZE SCANDAL (Dec. 2009), available
at http://www.africog.org/reports/Maize%20Report.pdf (describing in vivid detail the
underpinnings of the Kenyan maize scandal and the corruption associated with it).
4. See AFR. CTR. FOR OPEN GOVERNANCE, ANALYSIS OF THE TRITON OIL SCANDAL (July
2009), available at http://www.africog.org/reports/Africog/20newsletter-triton.pdf
(offering an in-depth look at the Kenyan Oil Scandal).
5. See, e.g., David Aduda, Exposed: How Officials Looted Schools' Millions, DAILY
NATION (Nairobi), Dec. 18, 2009, available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
11056/826874/-/vo5w9o/-/index.html (recounting how 103 million Kenyan shillings were
lost to embezzlement by senior officials, depriving the country's "20,000 primary, 4,000
secondary, 37 technical training institutions, and 116 special learning centres.").
6. See, e.g., MPs in 'Most Corrupt' League, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), Dec. 10, 2005;
REPUBLIC OF KENYA, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL REFORMS 74 (2010).
7. See, e.g., Njeri Rugene, Bribery in Kenya's Parliament, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), May
16, 2009, available at http/www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056t599016/-/u6adu9/-/index.html.
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of the 2007 presidential election is partly attributable to the public's
perception of the judiciary as partisan and unable to provide a civil
avenue for the resolution of the disputes generated by the fiercely
contested election.
Various explanations have been offered for the existence of
corruption in government. "Democratization may lead to incentives for
corruption, especially in the process of campaigning for election."8 For
example, Michela Wrong suggests that corruption is prevalent in Kenya
because ethnic cabals believe that it is their "turn to eat" once they
assume the reins of government.9 However, these explanations may be
symptomatic of a much deeper problem, namely institutional failure.
Dysfunctional or failed institutions often facilitate the abuse of power in
government. Without denigrating the role cultural norms may play in
encouraging corruption, this article adopts the approach of institutional
theorists who view corruption as "politically endogenous." 0 From this
perspective, institutional mechanisms that increase political
accountability-for example, by encouraging punishment of corrupt
individuals or reducing the informational problems related to
government activities-may reduce the incidence of corruption."
This article suggests that corruption in Kenyan government is
largely an institutional problem, rather than a cultural one. That is,
corruption can be attributed to the predominance of arbitrary power,
especially in the statutory (as opposed to constitutional) order. The
Kenyan statutory order grants executive, legislative, and judicial actors
broad powers without establishing effective procedural mechanisms to
circumscribe their exercise. In the absence of effective regulation, law
often aids the abuse of power and corruption. In other words, "in the
absence of fear of penalty or sanctions, there is nothing to deter [those
who wield power from] fraudulently enriching themselves" and violating
the law.12 In this scenario, government actors often disregard the
prescriptions of law, especially where they view legal requirements as
hindering the attainment of short-term political objectives or other
ends. Because law is dispensed with whenever it becomes convenient to
8. See Inge Amundsen, Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues 18 (Chr.
Michelsen Inst., Working Paper No. 7, 1999).
9. See MICHELA WRONG, IT's OUR TURN To EAT: THE STORY OF A KENYAN WHISTLE
BLOWER (2009).
10. See Wonbin Cho, What Are the Origins of Corruption in Africa? Culture or
Institution 3 (Feb. 15, 2009), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p311499
index.html (paper presented at the International Studies Association 2009 Convention).
11. See Daniel Lederman et al., Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions
Matter 3-4 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2708, Nov. 2001).
12. N.G. Egbue, Africa: Cultural Dimensions of Corruption and Possibilities for
Change, 12 J. Soc. Sci. 83, 84 (2006).
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do -so, a culture of impunity emerges where law ceases to be
authoritative.
Furthermore, the President, government ministers, and senior
public servants often use the law to intimidate their juniors into silence
or .into obeying illegal commands, largely because of the absence of
accountability mechanisms. Indeed, junior public servants are often
unwilling accomplices to abuses of power or corruption. Moreover, until
the promulgation of a new constitution in August 2010, the law did not
restrict the President's ability to make decisions without consulting the
cabinet or undermining the independence of the judiciary, nor did it
restrict the Chief Justice's ability to compromise the decisional
independence of judges, nor legislators' ability to become hired
mercenaries for the highest bidder. In the case of the legislature, the
failure to institutionalize codes of conduct functions as a license for
legislators to breach conflict of interest rules with impunity. In addition,
state secrecy laws such as the Official Secrets Act 3 have ensured that
the citizenry have little or no information about the activities of
government. Invariably, the citizenry only learn of abuses of power and
corruption long after they have occurred, by which time the damage
caused is nearly irreparable. Even new laws enacted to aid the fight
against corruption, such as the Public Officer Ethics Act,14 may actually
be used to strengthen the hand of power wielders, who often interpret
such laws in a manner that enhances their ability to intimidate public
servants. In these circumstances, constitutional reform must be
accompanied by comprehensive democratization of the legal order.
Using examples of corruption and abuses of power, this article
examines how governmental power is exercised in Kenya and analyzes
the potential of the new constitution-which took effect on August 27,
2010, following approval by the citizenry at a referendum held on
August 4, 2010-to enhance government accountability. This article is
motivated by a concern that democratization initiatives have not been
adequately concerned with regulation of the exercise of power within
the three branches of government. Part I examines the limitations of
representative democracy and the need for the establishment of
institutions for the day-to-day accountability of government. Using
illustrations of abuse of power and corruption, Part II explores how
power is exercised within the three branches of government in Kenya.
Part III analyzes the provisions of the new constitution dealing with the
branches of government. Part IV concludes with observations on the
13. Official Secrets Act, (1968) Cap. 187 (Kenya).
14. Public Officer Ethics Act, (2009) Cap. 183 (Kenya).
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need to democratize the statutory order15 to facilitate the realization of
the new constitution, and suggests administrative law reform as being
critical to this endeavor.
I. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
A. The Idea of Accountability
The practice of representative democracy-in which the citizenry
delegate their sovereignty to popularly elected representatives, who in
turn delegate their authority to bureaucrats-does not always ensure
that governmental power is only used for its intended purposes, namely
the protection of the rights of citizens and the pursuit of the public
good.16 This is because the people who govern are not always
accountable to the governed. In order to appreciate the limitations of
representative democracy, we need to understand the meaning of the
term accountability and how it can be realized.
Accountability may be defined as "a social relationship in which an
actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to
some significant other."' 7 This definition implies a relationship in which
"some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to
judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these
standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these
responsibilities have not been met."18 In this relationship the
"accountor" has an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct to
the "accountee."19 Explaining and justifying conduct entails different
activities, such as providing information about performance, debating
whether the conduct was proper, and judging of the accountor by the
accountee. 20 Furthermore, after judging the conduct of the accountor,
the accountee may either choose to reward the accountor in case of
adequate performance, or impose sanctions in case of poor
performance. 21 Though accountability always operates ex post, that is,
after the conduct of the accountor, "accountability mechanisms can
exert ex ante effects, since the anticipation of sanctions may deter the
15. The statutory order consists of statutes, regulations, codes of conduct, and practices
of governmental institutions.
16. Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 29, 32 (2005).
17. Mark Bovens, Public Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT 182, 184 (Ewan Ferlie et al. eds., 2007).
18. Grant & Keohane, supra note 16, at 29.
19. Bovens, supra note 17, at 184-85.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 185.
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powerful from abusing their positions in the first place."22
In the context of democracy, accountability institutions or
mechanisms serve four primary ends. First, these mechanisms make it
possible for the public to call those in public office to account. 23 From
this perspective, representative democracy is a chain of principal-agent
relationships, where the people (the primary principals) have
transferred their sovereignty to popular representatives, who, in turn,
have transferred their authority to ministers and public servants.24
Accountability mechanisms enable the people to hold these agents
accountable for the exercise of these delegated powers. Under ideal
conditions, the people would have sufficient information to enable them
to scrutinize the conduct of these agents. If the people were to find such
conduct to be unsatisfactory, they could then indicate their displeasure
by voting the offending representatives out of office.
Second, accountability mechanisms enable the people to prevent
abuses of power and corruption. 25 These mechanisms enable the
exposure of unauthorized, illegitimate, or unjust exercises of
governmental power. 26 Third, accountability mechanisms serve the
purpose of keeping the agents of the people on their toes, by constantly
keeping the agents aware of the fact that they will be called upon to
account for their actions, thereby helping the people to prevent abuses
of power and corruption.27 Finally, accountability mechanisms serve the
important goal of legitimizing government in the perception of the
citizenry by promoting acceptance of government authority and
confidence in the government. 28
B. Realizing Accountability
How, then, is accountability to be realized? There are different
accountability arrangements depending on whether the polity in
question has adopted a parliamentary or presidential system of
government or a hybrid of these two. A parliamentary system is a
system of government in which the executive (the prime minister and
the cabinet) is chosen by and is accountable to the legislature. 29 It is
22. Grant & Keohane, supra note 16, at 30.
23. Bovens, supra note 17, at 192.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 193.
26. Grant & Keohane, supra note 16, at 30.
27. See Bovens, supra note 17, at 193.
28. Id.
29. Kaare Strom, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, 37
EuR. J. POL. RES. 261, 264 (2000).
346
ABUSE OF POWER AND CORRUPTION IN KENYA
also defined by the following features: the sovereignty of the legislature,
the unification or fusion of legislative and executive power, the
concentration of political power in a collective and responsible cabinet,
and the accountability of ministers to the legislature.30 A presideitial
system of government is defined as one in which executive powei is
exercised by a President who is elected by the people (or an electoral
college, as in the United States).31 Here, the President draws power
directly from the people. The main difference between the two systems
is that presidentialism is based on the separation of executive and
legislative powers, while parliamentarism is based on the fusion of
executive and legislative powers.32 In addition, whereas policy making is
largely the responsibility of the executive in parliamentary systems, it is
shared by the President and the legislature in presidential systems.
Hybrid, or semipresidential systems of government, are those that
combine features of parliamentarism and presidentialism in the sense
that they have both "a popularly-elected fixed-term president and a
prime minister and cabinet responsible to the legislature."33
Their differences notwithstanding, these representative systems of
government are all defined by the delegation of power from voters to
elected representatives and then to delegates of the latter. The people
therefore need to ensure that the elected representatives and their
delegates are answerable for their exercise of governmental power.
Accordingly, various mechanisms have been established to facilitate the
accountability of the three branches of government.
1. Accountability of the Executive and Public Service
In parliamentary systems, especially those based on the
Westminster model of government, executive accountability has largely
revolved around the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which denotes
the accountability of government ministers to the legislature. In this
system, ministers are viewed as agents of the legislature and are
accountable to the legislature for the exercise of their delegated powers.
30. R.A.W. Rhodes, Is Westminster Dead in Westminster (and Why Should We Care)?,
Inaugural Lecture in the Australia and New Zealand School of Government-Australian
National University Public Lecture Series 3-4 (Feb. 23, 2005), available at
http://www.rodrhodes.com.aulwp/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/anzsog-lecture.pdf.
31. Scott Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and
Democracy, 29 COMP. POL. 449, 449 (1997).
32. See Jos6 Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi, Democratic Institutions and
Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered, 5 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 151, 152 (2002).
33. Robert Elgie, The Perils of Semi-Presidentialism. Are they Exaggerated?, 15
DEMOCRATIZATION 49, 51 (2008).
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Ministerial responsibility requires ministers to take corporate
responsibility for the activities of their departments, a process that
entails answering questions from the public (which are posed to the
ministers by ordinary legislators) and rectifying any mistakes that come
to light.34 While ministers are required to explain or justify their
departments' actions, the concept of ministerial responsibility does not
impose any obligation on ministers to take personal responsibility for
departmental activities or resign on account of the failures of their
subordinates.35
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility imposes no legal obligation
on ministers to resign where there is abuse of power or corruption in
their departments. Even where ministers take political responsibility
for abuse of power or corruption in their departments by accepting
corporate blame or resigning, the question of which public servant "is
exactly to blame usually lies buried behind a wall of official silence."36 In
any case, satisfaction of the legislature is the "touchstone of
accountability" in Westminster governmental systems.37 Accordingly,
governmental departments are regarded as publicly accountable,
provided the responsible minister furnishes the legislature with an
explanation it deems satisfactory. Such accountability may be
inadequate, however, especially where the legislature does not have
sufficient information on the circumstances surrounding the
governmental matter in question. Unless the legislature has effective
mechanisms and resources for conducting investigations into the affairs
of government, it has no alternative but to accept the explanations given
by such a minister, however inadequate. Furthermore, where the ruling
party has a majority in the legislature, legislative scrutiny of
governmental actions may be perfunctory because opposition parties in
such scenarios have little or no power to hold government to account.
It should be noted that ministerial responsibility is only episodic. It
does not demand active legislative supervision of government because
there is a "reasonable likelihood" that instances of maladministration
will come to the attention of legislators eventually.38 However, in view of
the complexity of modern government, arguably many significant
instances of maladministration may escape the attention of legislators.
34. Richard Mulgan, Westminster Accountabilities: Holding Power to Account in
Modern Democracies 4 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.vic.ipaa.org.auldocument/
item/32 (paper presented at the 2006 Spotlight on Spring Street Seminar of the Institute
of Public Administration Australia).
35. Id.
36. Mulgan, supra note 34, at 7.
37. Bruce Stone, Administrative Accountability in the Westminster' Democracies:
Towards a New Conceptual Framework, 8 GOVERNANCE 505, 512 (1995).
38. Id. at 511.
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In addition, mechanisms that protect the confidentiality of
governmental matters, such as state secrecy laws, may frustrate efforts
of the public to hold government accountable.
Ministerial responsibility is buttressed by the concept of collective
responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature, which obligates ministers
to defend government policy. Thus a minister who disagrees with
government policy should resign if he or she intends to oppose such
policy. This means that if a government is defeated on a vote of no
confidence, 39 all of the ministers must resign, giving the people an
opportunity to delegate their power to a new government.
In presidential systems, it is argued that the dispersal of executive
and legislative power enables friction between the legislative and
executive branches of government, thereby facilitating the
accountability of the executive. 40 This dispersal of power prevents
corruption and abuse of power by enabling the legislature to contest
actions of the executive.4 1 As in parliamentary systems, the executive in
presidential systems is also accountable to the legislature, which
establishes committees to oversee the performance of the executive.
Another notable distinction between the two systems concerns the
accountability of public servants. Whereas public servants in
parliamentary systems are primarily accountable to a single principal
(that is, the minister), public servants in presidential systems are
accountable to multiple principals (specifically, the President and the
legislature).42
Ensuring executive accountability is an even more daunting task in
hybrid systems. Here, the potential for conflict between the President
and prime minister may blur established lines of accountability, 43 with
the result that significant instances of abuse of power or corruption will
go unchecked. This is likely in situations of "cohabitation,"44 in which
the legislature is not cohesive and does not act with one voice.
Cohabitation denotes a situation in which "the president is from one
party or political grouping and the prime minister is from an opposed
39. A vote of no confidence is a motion that opposition parties put before the legislature
in the hope of defeating or weakening the government.
40. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
41. N.W. Barber, Prelude to the Separation of Powers, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 59, 60-61
(2001).
42. Strom, supra note 29, at 269-70.
43. Oleh Protsyk, Intra-Executive Competition Between President and Prime Minister:
Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation Under Semi-Presidentialism, 54 POL.
STUD. 219, 220-21 (2006).
44. See Elgie, supra note 33.
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party or grouping."45 In such cases of intra-executive conflict, abuses of
power or corruption by or involving public servants may also escape
scrutiny. Accountability deficits may also arise in hybrid systems in
which the legislature is dominated by one party because there will be no
effective check on the executive.
In all three systems, unelected bureaucrats often exercise the
executive powers.4 6 Meanwhile, the legislature has neither the time nor
the resources to check the powers of the executive. Perhaps even more
significantly, there is often an information asymmetry47 that favors
bureaucrats, with the result that the legislature is, in many cases,
unable to oversee the exercise of power by public servants in a
meaningful manner.4 8
Many democracies have deemed it necessary to establish auxiliary
institutions, which seek to enhance the day-to-day accountability of the
executive. In this regard, institutions that prevent or punish
maladministration are particularly useful, especially because they
regulate the interactions of politicians and public servants in the
exercise of power. Examples of such institutions are hearings of
committees of the legislature in which ministers or public servants
appear and testify, obligations on the public service to report to the
legislature, appointments of ombudsmen, and creation of public service
commissions. 49 These institutions are especially notable in that-unlike
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility-they regard public servants
as independent of the elected government and as "the guardians of a
public trust underlying the exercise of all public authority."5 0 Thus, even
though public servants are agents of the current executive, they are
ultimately accountable to the people for the exercise of their delegated
powers. These special institutions of accountability serve two related
functions: first, ensuring that the government always uses the public
service solely to promote the public interest; and, second, ensuring that
public servants do not use their positions to pursue private or partisan
45. Id. at 54.
46. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 243, 243 (1987).
47. The legislature can only hold government to account if it is sufficiently informed
about the goings-on in government. But it requires resources and time to investigate
conduct of the executive. In the absence of such resources in countries such as Kenya, an
information asymmetry arises since bureaucrats, who implement the policy decisions of
government, will then have much better information than the legislature.
48. See, e.g., Bruce Stone, Administrative Accountability in the 'Westminster'
Democracies: Towards a New Conceptual Framework, 8 GOVERNANCE 505, 511-15 (1995).
49. See Strom, supra note 29, at 269.
50. Lorne Sossin, Speaking Truth to Power: The Search for Bureaucratic Independence
in Canada, 55 U. TORONTo L.J. 1, 2 (2005).
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ends. Furthermore, these auxiliary institutions are typically
characterized by procedural safeguards that circumscribe the exercise of
power.
In Kenya, problems with the government's improper use of public
service and public servants' abuse of their positions have occurred in the
recent past. For example, a commission of inquiry established that in
the months preceding the 2007 general elections, the head of Public
Service and secretary to the cabinet ordered senior police officers to
train a large number of their juniors so that they could act as agents for
the ruling party.51 The commission of inquiry established that the role
of these officers "was to disrupt polling and where possible ensure that
government supporters amongst the candidates and voters prevailed."52
It is important to ensure that the concept of public service neutrality
does not facilitate either kind of abuse of power. Accordingly, public
servants should not, in the pretext of preserving their impartiality, be
prevented from exposing cases where the government is involved in
illegal acts or corruption. In such cases, public servants have a duty to
question or even "decline to follow instructions which are motivated by
improper partisan interests."53
Although public servants are agents of the government, they owe a
higher duty to the public to observe the rule of law. 54 As Lorne Sossin
has argued, the "rule of law doctrine imposes a public trust obligation
on public servants to ensure that the rule of law is respected and that
government directions which are inconsistent with the rule of law are
not followed."55 Should public servants choose to become whistleblowers
in the process of performing this duty, they ought to be given sufficient
legal protection.56 From this premise, public servants should not be
prevented from disclosing violations of the rule of law, corruption, and
abuses of power.5 7 Likewise, the concept of political neutrality should
not, as is often the case, be used as a shield against public scrutiny of
the actions of public servants on the pretext that "the regulation of the
51. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE 405-
07 (2008) (Kenya), available at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/PEVReportl.pdf
[hereinafter WAIG REPORT].
52. Id. at 406.
53. LORNE SOSSIN, COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM AND ADVER.
ACTIVITIES, DEFINING BOUNDARIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT FOR BUREAUCRATIC
INDEPENDENCE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE
25, 30 (2006), available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/Gomeryll/Research
Studies2/CISPAAVol2_2.pdf.
54. Id. at 37.
55. Id. at 38.
56. See id. at 36.
57. See id. at 45-46.
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civil service is a matter for the political executive alone to resolve."58
2. Accountability of the Legislature
In the case of the legislature, a common argument is that the
legislature is sovereign and should be left to regulate itself. In England,
for example, critics often argue that "[t]he freedom of speech and
debates and proceedings in Parliament are not to be impeached or
questioned in any court or place outside of Parliament."59 The claim is
the fact that the legislature derives its power directly from the people,
who can withdraw that power in an election should they wish, is a
sufficient accountability measure. Further, one might argue that the
legislature should be autonomous in its actions if it is to be an effective
guardian of the public interest. In Westminster systems, this autonomy
is asserted through the operation of the principle of parliamentary
privilege, which allows the legislature to maintain internal autonomy
from external actors such as the public, the executive, and the
judiciary.60 Questions of how the legislature runs its affairs between
elections are generally not asked. However, experience demonstrates
that the legislature can also be influenced by private interests, and the
making of public policy and law is often driven by strong and organized
interest groups at the expense of the public interest. A need therefore
arises to hold the legislature accountable.
Recognizing the fallibility of the legislature, countries such as the
United Kingdom and Australia have established institutions that seek
to enhance its day-to-day accountability.6 1 These accountability
mechanisms are premised on the belief that legislators are not only
political actors but are also "public officials who [ought to] exercise
power for a public purpose."62 These accountability mechanisms also
enhance public confidence in the legislature, in the sense that
legislators should not only act for the right reasons, but also should
appear to do so in the public eye.6 3 Accordingly, many legislatures have
established ethics regimes that regulate the conduct of their members
58. Sossin, supra note 50, at 15.
59. Dawn Oliver & Gavin Drewry, Introduction to THE LAW AND PARLIAMENT 1, 4
(Dawn Oliver & Gavin Drewry eds., 1998).
60. See Barry K. Winetrobe, The Autonomy of Parliament, in THE LAW AND
PARLIAMENT, supra note 59, at 14, 17-18.
61. Robert Kaye, Regulating Parliament: The Regulatory State Within Westminster 5
(Econ. & Soc. Res. Council Ctr. for Analysis of Risk and Reg., Discussion Paper No. 13,
2003).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., id. at 8.
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and maintain institutional integrity.6 4 For example, corruption and
misconduct in the House of Commons in 1990s Great Britain led to the
establishment of "an institutionalized system of standards,
investigation and sanction."6 5 Thus the British House of Commons now
has codified rules of conduct, a commissioner who acts as the principal
ethics adviser and investigator, and a Standards and Privileges
Committee that oversees the conduct of legislators and the work of the
commissioner.66
3. Accountability of the Judiciary
In the case of the exercise of judicial power, the judiciary should
remain autonomous because that is the only way in which it can
effectively fulfill its democratic role. In short, the judiciary should
regulate itself and the other branches of government should not
interfere in its affairs.67 Adopting this mindset often leaves the exercise
of power within the judiciary unchecked and explains why chief justices
in commonwealth countries have immense and unaccountable powers.
In Kenya, these powers of the Chief Justice may undermine the
decisional independence of judicial officers. Further, maladministration
in the judiciary, such as the misuse of public funds, may escape public
scrutiny when the judiciary does not account to the other branches of
government for the way it runs its administrative affairs. Indeed, public
accountability mechanisms are even more important in the case of the
judiciary.
Compared to the executive and legislative powers, judicial power is
unique since it is exercised by judicial officers who are typically
appointed and are therefore not accountable to the electorate in the way
that members of the executive and the legislature are.6 8 In addition,
because judges are typically unelected, the courts are often perceived as
undemocratic and a threat to good government.69 Accordingly, although
the judiciary plays the crucial role of limiting the will of the majority, its
64. Nicholas Allen, British Parliamentary Misconduct in the Early Twenty-First
Century 12 (March 31, 2009), available at http://www.psa.ac.uk/journalspdfl5/2009/
Allen.pdf (draft prepared for the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association).
65. Id. at 18.
66. Id. at 18-19.
67. E.g., Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good
Behavior" for Federal Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765, 765 (1989) (noting that "we have
endeavored to preserve an independent judiciary as a 'citadel of the public justice and the
public security."').
68. Beverley McLachlin, Judicial Power and Democracy, 12 SING. ACAD. L.J. 311, 311
(2000).
69. Id.
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legifimacy is often contested.
In order to enhance the accountability and legitimacy of the
judiciary, many countries have established judicial councils or
commissions. 70 While the specific role that judicial councils play tends to
vary from country to country, they often provide mechanisms for
circumscribing the exercise of judicial power.71 Typically, judicial
councils have the following powers over judicial officers and paralegal
staff: appointment; determining complaints, discipline, and removal;
and managing, evaluating, and monitoring performance.72 These powers
often facilitate effective regulation of the exercise of judicial power.
II. ABUSE OF POWER AND CORRUPTION
A. Organization, Exercise, and Accountability of Executive Power
Despite the establishment of numerous institutions seeking to
enhance the accountability of the executive, the exercise of power in
Kenya's executive branch has been characterized by significant abuse
and rampant corruption. In order to understand why these new
institutions have not enhanced the accountability of the executive, the
executive's historical organization, exercise of power, and methods of
accounting for its actions must be examined.
After gaining its independence in 1963, Kenya adopted a
parliamentary system of government based on the Westminster model. 73
In theory, the executive (consisting of a prime minister and a cabinet)
was accountable to the legislature. In addition, the prime minister and
the cabinet were supposed to implement public policy through a
meritocratic, impartial, and politically neutral public (or civil) service. 74
The Constitution of Kenya of 1963 (hereinafter, the Independence
Constitution) made elaborate provisions to ensure the autonomy and
neutrality of the public service. For example, it established an
autonomous Public Service Commission (PSC) and put it in charge of
recruitment, promotion, discipline, and dismissal.75 The Independence
Constitution also imposed restrictions that ensured that members of the
70. Violaine Autheman & Sandra Elena, Global Best Practices: Judicial Councils:
Lessons from Europe and Latin America 1 (IFES Rule of Law White Paper Series, White
Paper No. 2, 2004).
71. But see id. at 11.
72. Id.
73. C. Odhiambo-Mbai, Public Service Accountability and Governance in Kenya Since
Independence, 8 AFR. J. POL. SCI. 113, 118 (2003).
74. Id.
75. See id. at 138-39.
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PSC would neither be political figures nor public officers, as such figures
might be indebted for their appointment to a political leadership
position.76 Members of the PSC also were given security of tenure.77
However, Kenya quickly shifted to a presidential system of
government following a series of constitutional amendments enacted in
the 1960s, which consolidated power in the presidency by weakening the
multiparty system, and gave the President control over critical
governmental agencies such as the Public Service.
Until the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010, the
executive consisted of the President, vice president, prime minister, two
deputy prime ministers, and ministers of government.78 Together these
officers made up the cabinet, whose function was "to aid and advise the
president in the government of Kenya."79 Further, the Independence
Constitution (as amended) provided that the cabinet was "collectively
responsible to the National Assembly for all things done by or under the
authority of the president or the vice-president or any other minister in
the execution of his office."8 0 This provision of the constitution could be
interpreted to mean that the President could only instruct the Public
Service to implement policy decisions that had been made collectively
and pursuant to deliberations of the cabinet.
In practice, however, the exercise of executive power was not
constrained by the doctrine of collective responsibility precisely because
this provision did not impose an obligation on the President to seek the
aid and advice of the cabinet.81 For all intents and purposes, the
President was an "executive with unshared responsibility for policy" and
was perfectly entitled to bypass the authority of the cabinet. 82 Indeed,
collective responsibility did not imply collective power for decision
making and merely obligated ministers to support and defend
government policies, irrespective of whether they participated in their
76. See CONSTITUTION, art. 106(3) (1963) (Kenya).
77. CONSTITUTION, art. 106(7) (1963) (Kenya). Security of tenure here denotes the legal
protection afforded to employees against dismissal without just cause.
78. Section 2 of the Sixth Schedule of the New Constitution provides that this
arrangement will prevail until the next general election. In the succeeding paragraphs, I
use the terms "Independence Constitution" and "New Constitution" to distinguish the
constitution being replaced from the new one.
79. CONSTITUTION, art. 17(2) (1963) (Kenya).
80. Id. art. 17(3).
81. See B.O. NWABUEZE, PRESIDENTIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 43 (1974). But
see id. at 199.
82. Id. at 199 (observing that under a parliamentary system of government, a prime
minister cannot afford to bypass the cabinet, "as otherwise he would incur the accusation
of wanting to subvert the Constitution, since he has a joint responsibility with the other
ministers for government and its policies.").
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formulation.83 These provisions of the now-repealed Independence
Constitution largely explain why successive presidents were accused of
governing with so-called "kitchen cabinets." Indeed, the President often
ignored the cabinet entirely or made important decisions affecting the
portfolios of ministers without involving or informing them. 84
Furthermore, although the prime minister was originally intended
to have a more significant role in exercising executive power, the
President ignored him in significant instances.85 Since the international
mediation that followed the Electoral Commission's bungling of the
2007 presidential elections, Kenya began experimenting with a hybrid
executive. The office of prime minister was created by an amendment to
the Independence Constitution, which meant that, in theory, the
President shared executive power with the prime minister. 86 In practice,
however, the President often bypassed the prime minister and instead
exercised power through the office of the head of the Public Service, who
was also secretary to the cabinet. As examined below, the office of the
head of the Public Service oversaw the day-to-day administration of the
Public Service, and it therefore possessed immense power. At the same
time, the Independence Constitution now required the legislature to
enact a statute setting out the powers of the prime minister. This
statute, which was enacted as the National Accord and Reconciliation
Act, conferred on the prime minister the "authority to co-ordinate and
supervise the execution of the functions and affairs of the Government
of Kenya."87 This sounded like a powerful office; however, by working
through the office of the head of the Public Service, the President
effectively undermined the powers of the prime minister.88
The primary objective of the constitutional amendments of the
1960s was to ensure presidential control of the Public Service. One
amendment empowered the President to appoint members of the PSC
without reference to anyone.89 A subsequent amendment enhanced the
83. Id. at 45.
84. E.g., Kipkirui K'Telwa, Karua Resigns from Cabinet, STANDARD (Nairobi), Apr. 6,
2009 (describing how the President ignored a cabinet member, who was the Justice
minister, when new judges were picked, leading the cabinet member to resign in protest).
85. E.g., Uproar as Kibaki Signs into Law the Controversial Media Bill, STANDARD
(Nairobi), Jan. 3, 2009 (reporting on the President's signing of controversial legislation
into law, despite the prime minister's assurances to the public that it would be returned to
the parliament).
86. CONSTITUTION, art. 15A(1) (1963) (Kenya); Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)
Act, No. 3 of 2008.
87. National Accord and Reconciliation Act, No. 4 of 2008, sched. 1 (Kenya).
88. See One Country, Two Presidents, NAIROBI CHRONICLE (June 14, 2009),
http://nairobichronicle.wordpress.com/2009/06/14/one-country-two-presidents.
89. See CONSTITUTION, art. 106(2) (1963) (Kenya); Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)
Act, No. 28 of 1964.
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President's control of the Public Service by giving him the power to
constitute and abolish offices in the Public Service, to make
appointments to any such office, and to terminate any such
appointment. 90 The aggregate effect of these amendments made-the
Public Service totally subservient to the President. Once President
Kenyatta assumed control over the Public Service, he soon began to
undermine its independence. The principle of meritocracy was quickly
set aside as the President filled key positions and effected promotions in
the Public Service without due regard to merit.9 1 From the early 1980s
on, the permanence of the Public Service was undermined as
''permanent secretaries and other senior public servants [were shuffled]
from organization to organization without due regard to their suitability
for the positions."92 In addition, it soon became common practice for the
President "to recruit permanent secretaries and other senior public
servants from outside the mainstream public service." 93
Although the PSC was the main repository of the power to recruit,
discipline, and dismiss public servants, the Independence Constitution
provided that it could-subject to the approval of the President-
delegate these powers to any officers in the Public Service. 94 Thus
disciplinary matters were initially handled at the ministry level before
being submitted to the PSC for final determination. In theory, the
tenure of public servants depended on their adherence to a code of
regulations, which was made under the Service Commissions Act 95 and
administered by the PSC. In practice, however, they served at "the
pleasure of the President."9 6 Thus the President could, and often did,
terminate their services at will.97 In addition, the government
acknowledged that disciplinary cases took too long in ministries before
they were submitted to the PSC for determination.9 8 Furthermore, the
PSC's decisions were often not implemented, "thus causing a lot of
90. Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No. 3) Act, No. 28 of 1964.
91. Cf. Odhiambo-Mbai, supra note 73, at 119.
92. Id. at 132.
93. Id.
94. Id. art. 107(1).
95. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, L.N. 28/2005, THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REGULATIONS
§ 25 (2005) (regulations set forth pursuant to The Service Commissions Act, (2008) Cap.
185 § 13).
96. CONSTITUTION, art. 25(1) (1963) (Kenya).
97. J.B. OJWANG, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: INSTITUTIONAL
ADAPTATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 91 (1990).
98. Memorandum, Francis K. Muthaura, Permanent Sec'y, Sec'y to the Cabinet and
Head of the Pub. Serv., Implementation of Delegated Powers and the Public Service
Commission's Decisions (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://www.dpm.go.ke/index.php?
option=com docman&task=doc-details&gid=102&Itemid=174.
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anxiety among the affected officers and also demotivating them."99
Evidently, the code of regulations was not always adhered to in matters
of discipline, which made it easy for senior public servants to intimidate
their juniors.
In addition, it should be noted that executive control of the Public
Service was effectuated through the politically established office, the
Permanent Secretary, Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Public
Service. This office was not contemplated by the Independence
Constitution, which only provided for the office of Permanent Secretary
to the Office of the President. 00 The office was established under the
aforementioned code of regulations, which made it "responsible to the
President for the administration of the Public Service." 01 In practice,
the holder of this office is also the secretary to the cabinet.
A number of laws and regulations were enacted over the last decade
to enhance the accountability of the Public Service. These include the
Public Officers Ethics Act of 2003,102 the Public Service Commission
Regulations of 2005,103 and the Public Procurement and Disposal Act of
2005.104 First, the Public Officers Ethics Act advances the ethics of
public officers by providing a code of conduct and ethics, which imposes
on public officers a duty of professionalism and prohibits activities such
as improper enrichment, conflicts of interest, acting for foreigners,
political partisanship, nepotism, and sexual harassment.105 It also
requires certain public officers to declare their wealth periodically. 06
Second, the Public Service Commission Regulations establish
mechanisms and procedures for the appointment, promotion, and
discipline of public servants.107 Third, the Public Procurement and
Disposal Act aims to ensure that public procurement processes are fair,
transparent, and nondiscriminatory. 08
Despite the existence of these new laws, the executive continued to
99. Id.
100. CONSTITUTION, art. 22(2) (1963) (Kenya).
101. PUB. SERV. COMM'N OF KENYA, CODE OF REGULATIONS § A.7 (2006), available at
http://www.publicservice.go.ke/index.php?option=com-docman&task=cat-view&gid=122&
Itemid=386.
102. Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 (Kenya).
103. PUB. SERV. COMM'N OF KENYA, L.N. 28/2005, THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
REGULATIONS (2005).
104. Public Procurement and Disposal Act, No. 3 (2005), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT
No. 77.
105. Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 §§ 11-21 (Kenya).
106. Id. § 26.
107. PUB. SERV. COMM'N OF KENYA, L.N. 28/2005, THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
REGULATIONS passim (2005).
108. Public Procurement and Disposal Act, No. 3 (2005), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT
No. 77 § 2.
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act with impunity in significant cases. The following examples of abuse
of power and corruption illustrate the limitations of the mechanisms of
accountability established under the old constitutional order following
independence.
Perhaps the most blatant illustration of the abuse of power by the
Public Service is the behavior of the head of Public Service and
secretary to the cabinet in relation to the 2007 general elections. The
Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence established that the
National Security Intelligence Service prepared a survey at the
direction of the head of Public Service on "the relative positions of the 3
presidential candidates in the polls."109 Alarmingly, the commission
found that "correspondence about the survey appeared to be arranged
outside the [national security intelligence] framework."" 0 Additionally,
the Commission established that "on a number of occasions the decision
making and behaviour of senior police officers was influenced by factors
outside the formal operating arrangements, chain of command and in
direct conflict with mandated duties.""' For example, the Commission
found that the head of Public Service ordered the Administration Police
to train a large number of its officers before polling day so that they
could act as agents for the Party of National Unity (under whose banner
President Kibaki was seeking reelection) during election polling.112 The
Commission reports that the "training was conducted by a senior
academic, and high ranking government officials including the
hierarchy of the Administration Police."113
The Commission also found that the role of these officers "was to
disrupt polling and where possible ensure that government supporters
amongst the candidates and voters prevailed."114 When the Commission
sought an explanation from the head of the Public Service, he responded
that the "deployment was approved by the Government and was
commissioned for security reasons" and that the "reason for sending
those people under plainclothes is that the area was very unfriendly." 15
According to the Commission, this "exercise was clandestine in
appearance and execution and fell outside the overall elections security
command and control arrangements led by the Commissioner of
Police."n 6 Notably, although he was acting in this partisan manner, the
109. WAKI REPORT, supra note 51, at 365-66.
110. Id. at 366.
111. Id. at 405.
112. See id. at 405-06.
113. Id. at 406.
114. Id.
115. Id. (emphasis omitted).
116. Id.
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head of the Public Service had earlier ordered public servants to remain
neutral during the elections.1 17 In these circumstances, it is arguable
that the head of the Public Service abused the powers of his office.
Whether pursuing regime objectives or engaging in corruption, the
typical excuse that government ministers or senior public servants have
given is that they are carrying out projects that have been approved by
the government. The Goldenberg scandal of the 1990s-which was a
conspiracy by government ministers, senior public servants, and
wheeler-dealers to steal public funds-illustrates how the law has
typically been violated in the pursuit of such "government-approved
projects."
Ostensibly intending to boost the country's foreign exchange
reserves by exporting gold and diamonds, a company called Goldenberg
International took advantage of the government's export compensation
scheme. As required by law, Goldenberg submitted an application to the
Minister for Finance for: (1) sole rights to export diamond jewelry and
gold out of Kenya for a maximum of ten years; (2) thirty-five percent
export compensation on the exports; and (3) approval to establish a
financial company to handle its export operations.118 In consideration
for the grant of these rights, Goldenberg promised that it would remit
fifty million dollars annually to the Central Bank of Kenya. 119
Goldenberg's application was based on the premise that "Kenya has a
reasonable supply of diamonds and gold."120 However, no diamonds are
mined locally and the supply of gold is limited.121 In addition, the Local
Manufacturers (Export Compensation) Act of 1974, which had been
enacted to encourage exports, only permitted export compensation on
eligible goods122 at the rate of twenty percent of the value of the goods
exported.123 Moreover, such compensation was only due if the goods
were physically examined and certified prior to exportation.124
Thereafter, the foreign currency paid for the goods had to be received by
an authorized dealer, usually a bank, within ninety days of the date of
payment, and the person claiming export compensation was required to
117. James Ratemo, Muthaura Orders Civil Servants to Resign over Politics, E. AFR.
STANDARD (Nairobi), Jan. 31, 2007.
118. See REPORT OF THE JUD. COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE GOLDENBERG AFFAIR T 78
(2005) (Kenya), available at http://www.tikenya.org/documents/Goldenberg%20Report.pdf
[hereinafter GOLDENBERG AFFAIR].
119. See id. $ 135.
120. Id. 79.
121. Id. 80.
122. Eligibility is assessed according to rules of origin contained in the Local
Manufacturers (Export Compensation) (Procedures) Regulations made under the Act.
123. GOLDENBERG AFFAIR, supra note 118, 104.
124. Id. T 98.
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provide evidence of such payment.125
All of these requirements were violated in the implementation of the
Goldenberg scam. First, the Minister for Finance unilaterally approved
Goldenberg's application and subsequently failed to stop the project
despite a technical evaluation that revealed it was devaluing the
Kenyan shilling.126 The cabinet did not formally consider, let alone
approve, the project.127 When later called to account for his action, the
Minister for Finance stated that he acted "in pursuance of government
policy."128
Second, the minister approved the payment of compensation at the
rate of thirty-five percent of the value of exports and granted a
monopoly to Goldenberg, contrary to the provisions of the relevant
laws.129 Because the law on export compensation only allowed a
maximum compensation of twenty percent of the value of exports, the
minister approved the payment of the extra fifteen percent to
Goldenberg as ex gratia, pending the amendment of the law to formalize
the payment of the thirty-five percent export compensation due under
the deal with Goldenberg.1s0 Thus the minister gave his approval
despite being aware that it was necessary to amend the law before the
rate of thirty-five percent compensation could be effected legally. In
order to circumvent the law, the extra fifteen percent compensation and
the monopoly were instead granted administratively. This extra
compensation was then disguised as "customs refunds" in the
government's supplementary estimates presented to the legislature. 31
Not detecting the cover up, the legislature therefore erroneously
approved the payment of the extra compensation to Goldenberg.
Third, Goldenberg did not export any diamonds or gold but
nonetheless claimed and was paid export compensation at the rate of
thirty-five percent.132 The law required that the Ministry of Finance had
to be satisfied that exports of eligible goods had in fact taken place and
that foreign currency had been received for the goods before it could
forward the claim to the Commissioner of Customs and Excise for
payment of compensation."13 With the aid of senior public servants at
the Ministry of Finance and the Commissioner of Customs and Excise,
Goldenberg was able to falsify records to show that gold and diamond
125. Id.
126. Id. 105.
127. See id. 83.
128. Id.
129. Id. 79.
130. Id. 1 104.
131. Id. 1 191.
132. Id. 1 205.
133. Id. 1 128.
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jewelry had been processed and exported, when no such processing or
exporting had, in fact, taken place.134 Goldenberg then sought and
obtained compensation for the nonexistent exports.135 Subsequently, it
submitted foreign currency, which it had either obtained locally or
withdrawn from its overseas accounts, as the proceeds of its exports to
the Central Bank.136 In this endeavor, Goldenberg was aided by the
Central Bank, which granted it a license to deal in foreign currency,
despite established regulations, stipulating that only banks could be
holders of such licenses.1 37 It is estimated that Kenya lost hundreds of
millions of dollars as a result of this scam.135
From this account, it is clear that corruption may be the result of
abuses of power by government ministers due to the absence of effective
accountability mechanisms. In this regard, corruption has been aided by
the selective exercise of prosecutorial power. Section 26 of the
Independence Constitution vested in the attorney general the power to
decide if and when an individual could be prosecuted for a criminal
offense. It also gave the attorney general the power to manage criminal
proceedings that had been instituted or undertaken by other persons or
authorities and to terminate any prosecution. This power was often
abused, resulting in individuals being prosecuted, only for charges later
to be dropped. In the context of corruption, this power was often applied
selectively, with the result that the perpetrators of these crimes were
hardly ever punished.139 In the Goldenberg Affair, the attorney general
chose to institute several cases against the perpetrators of the fraud,
instead of instituting a single case, which would have been more
efficient as all cases related to the same offenses and the accused
persons were the same.140 The attorney general consolidated some of the
cases, terminated others, and then instituted new ones, creating a
"pointless merry go round resulting in serious delay."'14 In light of these
circumstances, it is plausible that the selective exercise of the
prosecutorial power was "part of an orchestrated cover-up."142 Indeed,
none of the cases ever proceeded to a full hearing.
Another significant loophole in the institutional framework was that
public servants were not empowered to resist the illegal instructions of
their seniors, government ministers, or the President, with the result
134. Id. 549.
135. Id.
136. Id. T 162,178.
137. Id. 181.
138. See id. ch. 7[h].
139. See, e.g., WAKI REPORT, supra note 51, at 455-57.
140. See GOLDENBERG AFFAIR, supra note 118, $ 776.
141. Id. 778.
142. Id. 783.
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that they often became accomplices to grand corruption schemes. For
example, the Government Financial Regulations required public
servants to comply with the instructions of ministers, even if the former
considered such instructions to be illegal or improper. 143 Public servants
were required to implement the instructions of the minister before
registering any objections. These regulations even obliged public
servants to implement verbal instructions of ministers, although they
could then ask for written confirmation of these instructions.144
The practical absence of security of tenure in the Public Service also
means that public servants often have no choice but to do the bidding of
their seniors, government ministers, and the President. Because they
have the power to dismiss or suspend public servants, the President and
his ministers are able to intimidate public servants, as demonstrated by
the recent resignation of Jacinta Mwatela, the former deputy governor
of the Central Bank. By many accounts, Mrs. Mwatela was considered
to be "an exemplary public official of uncommon honesty in a very
corrupt system."145 Indeed, she had refused to approve the paperwork
for the export compensation claims of Goldenberg.146 In the months
preceding her resignation in 2008, Mrs. Mwatela, who also served as the
chair of the Central Bank's tender committee, refused to approve a
tender for the printing of new currency because she believed that it
violated the Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005.147 It appears,
however, that the government was intent on awarding the tender and
saw Mrs. Mwatela as an obstacle. Accordingly, the President removed
her from the Central Bank by appointing her as the permanent
secretary of the newly created Ministry of Development of Northern
Kenya.148 At the same time, the President appointed a new deputy
governor for the bank. Thus a career banker was "promoted" to head a
ministry of development. At first, Ms. Mwatela declined to take the
appointment, contending that it was contrary to the Central Bank of
Kenya Act, which she thought gave her security of tenure.149 The
transfer soon attracted the attention of the public, who thought that she
143. See id. 591.
144. E.g., id. 561 (quoting MINISTRY OF FIN., GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL REGULATIONS
AND PROCEDURES 1$ 5-8 (1989) (Kenya)).
145. Editorial, Mwatela Case Raises Issues of Discipline, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), Sept.
13, 2008, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Editoriall-/440804/470194/-/qllh3iz/-/index.html.
146. Robert Shaw, Opinion, Mwatela Deserved Better Treatment, DAILY NATION
(Nairobi), Sept. 16, 2008, available at http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/-/440808
471588/-/3ls9gal-/index.html.
147. Lucas Barasa, Mwatela Declines New Job and Reports at CBK, DAILY NATION
(Nairobi), Sept. 12, 2008, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/469718/-/tkd6wt/-/index.html.
148. See id.
149. Id.
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was being treated poorly.150 The attorney general quickly issued an
opinion in which he clarified that like all other public servants, Mrs.
Mwatela's continued service as deputy governor could only be at the
pleasure of the President. 151 Further, the attorney general asserted that
the Independence Constitution granted security of tenure only to the
governor of the Central Bank. At this point, Mrs. Mwatela chose to
resign from the Public Service.152
It is clear that the attorney general issued an interpretation of the
law that suited the interests of the executive perfectly. Shortly
thereafter, the Central Bank proceeded with the single-sourced
procurement that Mrs. Mwatela had vehemently opposed. 53 This case
demonstrates how public servants attempting to protect the public
interest might easily be intimidated into implementing corrupt deals
out of fear of losing their position. Furthermore, the procedures and
processes established to ensure fair treatment of public servants
whenever they are confronted with concerted intimidation tactics or
harassment by powerful ministers or senior public servants are either
inadequate or ignored in practice. For example, Kenyan courts have
held that the head of the Public Service Commission has the power to
transfer a public servant from one position to another without due
process. 154 The high court held in one case that a public servant who had
been transferred from one position to another because he had "engag[ed]
in 'acts of insubordination' had no right to be heard before the transfer
became effective.' 55
In addition, public servants are often intimidated into silence. For
example, in the Anglo Leasing scam, the head of the Public Service
threatened public servants who leaked government documents with
punishment under the Official Secrets Act.'56 In this respect, the Public
150. See, e.g., Opinion, On Mwatela, The AG Should Have Gone By the Public Wish,
DAILY NATION (Nairobi), Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/-/440808/
471578/-/3Is9fe/-/index.html.
151. See Wachira Kang'aru, Law Clear on Removal of Deputy Governor, DAILY NATION
(Nairobi), Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/471610/-/ywwlgtz/-
/index.html.
152. David Mugonyi, No Thank You, Mwatela Says, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), Sept. 16,
2008, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-11056/4716121-/tkt5h5/-lindex.html.
153. Jaindi Kisero, De La Rue Gets Another Currency Deal Without Rival Bids, DAILY
NATION (Nairobi), July 18, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/626170/-item/0/-
/y9oxv2/-l/index.html.
154. See Republic v. The Permanent Sec'y/Sec'y to the Cabinet and Head of Pub. Serv.
Office of the President and the Permanent Sec'y, (2006) e.K.L.R. 1, 3 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
155. Id.
156. Gladwell Otieno, The NARC's Anti-Corruption Drive in Kenya, 14 AFR. SECURITY
REV., no. 4, 2005, at 69, 75-76 (describing another government procurement scandal, this
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Officer Ethics Act is proving to be a double-edged sword. While its
declared purpose is to advance the ethics of public officers, it may aid
corruption because senior public servants often use its provisions to
intimidate their subordinates into silence. Among other things, the Act
provides that "[a] person who, without lawful excuse, divulges
information acquired in the course of acting under this Act is guilty of
an offence and is liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding five
million shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years
or to both."157 In the context of the Mwatela case, for example, the
governor of the Central Bank invited the police to investigate the
leakage of information from the bank. 158
B. Organization, Exercise, and Accountability of Legislative Power
While it is arguable that the legislature is becoming an institution
of "genuine . .. countervailing power,"159 there are definite concerns that
it is not sufficiently accountable, especially in the manner in which
legislators have exercised their "collective powers" of policy making,
legislating, and overseeing the executive branch. As examined below,
the absence of effective accountability mechanisms in the legislature
has produced two undesirable results. First, legislators are vulnerable
to influence from special interest groups, which jeopardizes the ability of
the legislature to safeguard the public interest. Second, the legislature's
ability to hold the executive accountable is questionable because its
committees, which form a critical part of its arsenal of oversight
instruments, often consist of legislators against whom credible
allegations of corruption have been made, and who cannot therefore be
expected to be genuine champions of the public interest.
At the time of independence, the legislature had two chambers, a
House of Representatives and a Senate. The bicameral legislature was
part of a federalist system, created by political parties representing
minority ethnic groups that thought such a structure would protect
their interests.1o However, the federal system was not sustained. Once
the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party, which represented
time involving a contract with Anglo Leasing and Finance Ltd. for passport issuing
equipment).
157. Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 § 41 (Kenya).
158. Samwel Kumba, Kenya: CBK Probes Key Data Leakage, CITIZEN (Dar es Salaam),
Sept. 26, 2008, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200809260431.html.
159. Joel D. Barkan & Fred Matiangi, Kenya's Tortuous Path to Successful Legislative
Development, in LEGISLATIVE POWER IN EMERGING AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES 33, 33 (Joel D.
Barkan ed., 2009).
160. See Stephen N. Ndegwa, Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two
Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics, 91 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 599, 613 (1997).
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the interests of the majority ethnic groups, assumed power, it
undermined and then abolished the federal system and bicameral
legislature. On the one hand, the KANU government withheld funds
from the regional governments, which soon lost their viability.161 Such
machinations frustrated the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU),
the opposition party representing minority interests, which then
decided to disband and join the ruling party in 1964. Kenya thus
became a de facto one-party state. 162 On the other hand, the bicameral
legislature was terminated by a constitutional amendment in 1966 that
merged the two chambers into a National Assembly.163 Today, the
National Assembly consists of 210 elected members, twelve nominated
members, and two ex officio members, namely the speaker of the
assembly and the attorney general.
The independence of the legislature was further undermined by a
series of constitutional amendments, the effect of which was to
consolidate power in the presidency. Some of these amendments gave
the President the power to suspend the proceedings of or dissolve the
legislature.164 The legislature therefore had no control of its calendar,
and the President could simply terminate its proceedings whenever he
felt that the legislature was going off course. Additionally, the absence
of political party competition enabled the President to control the
appointment of the presiding officer, or speaker, of the legislature. Only
individuals who were considered to be loyal to the President could be
elected to the office of speaker, which played a pivotal role in facilitating
the agenda of the executive in the legislature. 65
Therefore, the legislature became a mere appendage of the executive
that was administered through the office of the President. For example,
the bureaucracy of the legislature was part of the public service. Hence
the public service recruited personnel for the legislature's bureaucracy
and regulated its terms and conditions of service. The committee system
of this legislature was also rudimentary and it therefore had little
capacity to hold the executive accountable. 66 Nor did it have sufficient
161. Id. at 606.
162. David M. Anderson, 'Yours in Struggle for Majimbo' Nationalism and the Party
Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 1955-64, 40 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 547, 547 (2005)
(explaining why KADU disbanded and joined KANU).
163. CONSTITUTION, art. 30 (1963) (Kenya). The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)
Act, No. 40 of 1966.
164. CONSTITUTION, art. 59(1), (2) (1963) (Kenya).
165. See Barkan & Matiangi, supra note 159, at 40 (explaining how one of the
mechanisms used by African presidents to control the assembly was by "control[1ing] the
appointment and approach of its chief presiding officer, the Speaker").
166. See id. at 37 (revealing that in actuality the legislature was dependent on the
executive to assign it many of its resources).
366
ABUSE OF POWER AND CORRUPTION IN KENYA
funds, as the Ministry of Finance ensured that it was starved of funds
when determining its budget.167 In addition, legislators were poorly paid
and depended on executive patronage for their political survival. For
example, those who were deemed loyal were appointed as ministers,
assistant ministers, or chairmen of public corporations. Further, the
President often gave legislators cash handouts to enable them to meet
the demands of their constituents. Due to these constraints, the
legislature played only a minimal role in policy making and legislation,
even if it provided a useful forum for the ventilation of issues of national
concern.
Nevertheless, the return to multiparty politics in the 1990s
facilitated the growth of the legislature's independence by, among other
things, creating a political environment in which the legislature's
reform could be meaningfully deliberated. It was not until 2000 that the
independence of the legislature was guaranteed, following an
amendment to the constitution that unlinked the legislature from the
executive by establishing a parliamentary service to oversee the
legislature's administrative affairs.168 The enactment of a statutory law
further facilitated the implementation of this amendment.169 In
addition, these reforms sought to dilute the powers of the speaker by
creating a Parliamentary Service Commission (PaSC).170 The legislators
also enacted laws which improved their remuneration and terms of
service exponentially. 171 Indeed, their emoluments are now the highest
on the continent.172 Presumably, their new salaries should have freed
them from the financial dependency on the executive that had
hampered their effectiveness during the single-party era.
The Parliamentary Service consists of a clerk of the National
Assembly and other officers appointed by the PaSC.173 The clerk is the
chief executive of the Parliamentary Service, and is responsible for
matters of day-to-day administration. 174 Another key function of the
clerk is to advise members of the legislature on parliamentary
procedure and practice. 175 The clerk is accountable to the PaSC, and can
be suspended or removed from office "at any time and in such manner
as may be prescribed under [the Parliamentary Service] Act . . . for
167. See id. (recounting that for nearly fifty years the assembly was understaffed to a
point that it did not have its own legal draftsperson).
168. Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, No. 3 of 1999.
169. Parliamentary Service Act, (2000) Cap. 185 (Kenya).
170. CONSTIrUION, art. 45B (1963) (Kenya).
171. National Assembly Remuneration (Amendment) Act, No. 2 of 2003 (Kenya).
172. Barkan & Matiangi, supra note 159, at 55-57.
173. CONSTITUTION, arts. 45A, 45B (1963) (Kenya).
174. Parliamentary Service Act, (2000) Cap. 185 § 13 (Kenya).
175. Id. § 14.
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inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from
infirmity of body or mind or from any other cause) or for
misbehaviour." 176
On the other hand, the PaSC consists of the speaker of the
legislature (who is the chairman), a vice chairman, the leader of
government business in the legislature, the leader of the opposition
party with the highest number of seats in the legislature, and seven
members appointed by the legislature from among its members.177 Of
the seven ordinary members, four are nominated by the parliamentary
party (or parties) forming the government, while the other three are
nominated by the parliamentary parties forming the opposition. 178 The
vice chairman is elected by the PaSC from the lot of these ordinary
members.179 Upon the dissolution of the legislature, all the members of
the PaSC remain in office until new members are appointed by the next
legislature.180 The powers of the PaSC include constituting and
abolishing offices in the Parliamentary Service and directing and
supervising the administration of the Service.181 As for accountability,
the PaSC answers to the legislature; for example, it is required to
submit annual audits of its expenditures to the legislature.182
Furthermore, it is required to annually prepare and present to the
legislature a report of its operations.183
The speaker also presides over the legislature and is elected by
legislators in accordance with its rules of procedure, also known as
"standing orders."184 The speaker is assisted by a deputy, who is also
elected by the members of the legislature. In keeping with the traditions
of the Westminster system, the speaker is the spokesperson or
representative of the legislature. 85 Subject to the provisions of the
standing orders, the speaker wields considerable power with respect to
influencing the agenda and deliberations of the legislature. For
example, the speaker determines who contributes to deliberations,
closes debate and determines when matters should be put to vote, and
punishes members who do not adhere to the established rules of debate
176. Id. § 16.
177. CONSTITUTION, art. 45B(1) (1963) (Kenya).
178. Id. art. 45B(1)(e).
179. Id. art. 45B(1)(b).
180. Id. art. 45B(2)(a).
181. Id. art. 45B(5)(a), (d).
182. Id. art. 45B(5)(e)(ii).
183. Parliamentary Service Act, (2000) Cap. 185 § 25 (Kenya).
184. CONSTITUTION, art. 37 (1963) (Kenya).
185. See Marcelo Jenny & Wolfgang C. Miller, Presidents of Parliament: Neutral
Chairmen or Assets of the Majority?, in PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN
EUROPE 326, 330 (Herbert Doring ed., 1995).
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and parliamentary behavior.186 In exercising these powers, the speaker
should ensure that he or she does not "hinder the legitimate expression
of all shades of opinion while at the same time ensuring that
parliamentary debates run smoothly."187 In addition, the speaker has
the power to interpret the standing orders and other regulations
governing the functioning of the legislature. Where the standing orders
do not resolve a matter in question, the speaker has the power to resolve
such matters 88 and may be guided by the precedents of the legislature.
The speaker and the deputy speaker both answer to the legislature
and can be removed from office by a resolution supported by the votes of
at least seventy-five percent of all members of the legislature. 89
Although this may seem to be a high threshold, the record of the
legislature demonstrates that legislators would be able to obtain the
necessary votes if they deemed it to be in their best interest to get rid of
the speaker. Thus the fact that legislators can dismiss the speaker
limits the ability of the speaker to regulate the manner in which the
legislators exercise their collective power to make policies, laws, and
hold the executive to account. In these circumstances, the speaker will
be mindful of the fact that he or she can be removed from office by
legislators. The speaker is only an ex officio member of the legislature.
Once elected, the speaker will likely want to be in the good graces of the
legislators. While presiding officers in other democracies are also elected
by legislators, the vulnerability of the speaker to the whims of
legislators requires the creation of auxiliary mechanisms to facilitate
the accountability of the exercise of the legislature.
Since the relevant laws regarding removal of the speaker and clerk
have not circumscribed how these wide powers of dismissal are
supposed to be exercised, they remain subject to abuse and may serve to
make the speaker and the clerk subservient to the legislature and the
PaSC, respectively. In the case of the PaSC, it is worth noting that it
has a short-term perspective, given that each legislature only has a
shelf life of five years. 90 Because it wields immense power over the
clerk, the PaSC arguably may prevail upon the clerk to make decisions
that only serve the short-term objectives of legislators. In these
circumstances, it is doubtful whether, for example, the legislature can
objectively debate audits of the accounts of the PaSC.
186. Republic of Kenya National Assembly, Standing Orders, (2008) §§ 47(3), 53(1)-(2),
75(4), 97(2).
187. GEORGES BERGOUGNOUS, PRESIDING OFFICERS OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLIES: A WORLD COMPARATIVE STUDY 74 (1997).
188. Republic of Kenya National Assembly, Standing Orders, (2008) § 1.
189. CONSTITUTION, arts. 37(2)(c), 38(3)(d) (1963) (Kenya).
190. CONSTITUTION, art. 59(4) (1963) (Kenya).
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A different picture of the democratic character of the legislature also
emerges when one examines how legislators exercise their collective
power to make policies, laws, and to hold the executive accountable.
This power is exercised through debate and voting in plenary sessions of
the legislature. Its exercise is facilitated by the establishment of
committees, which constitute a mechanism for providing legislators
with the information they need to implement decisions. The committee
system enables the legislature to organize its affairs and to shadow the
operations of government ministries, departments, and agencies.' 9 '
Thus the business of the legislature is primarily conducted in, or
through, the committees. With respect to holding the executive
accountable on a daily basis, the work of the legislature revolves around
the so-called departmental committees, which investigate the activities
and administration of the government ministries, departments, and
agencies assigned to them.192 At present, there are twelve such
committees.193 Their functions are to investigate and report on the
activities and administration of the assigned ministries and
departments, to study and review legislation referred to them, and to
recommend proposed legislation. 94
Other critical committees are the Public Accounts Committee and
the Public Investments Committee, which investigate the expenditures
of government ministries and departments. 95 Both have the power to
examine public accounts and the reports of the controller and auditor
general.196 These committees have been given significant powers to
enable them to carry out their functions, including the power to
summon individuals to appear before them.197 The committees are
constituted according to the distribution of seats among the political
parties represented in the legislature.198 While the majority party also
has the majority of seats in the committees, in practice the chairperson
191. See Barkan & Matiangi, supra note 159, at 48-49.
192. Republic of Kenya National Assembly, Standing Orders, (2008) § 198(3).
193. These are the committees on (1) Administration and National Security; (2)
Agriculture, Livestock and Cooperatives; (3) Defence and Foreign Relations; (4) Education,
Research and Technology; (5) Energy, Communication and Information; (6) Finance,
Planning and Trade; (7) Health; (8) Justice and Legal Affairs; (9) Labour and Social
Welfare; (10) Lands and Natural Resources; (11) Local Authorities; and (12) Transport,
Public Works and Housing. Id. sched. 2.
194. Id. § 198(3).
195. Barkan & Matiangi, supra note 159, at 49.
196. Id.
197. Republic of Kenya National Assembly, Standing Orders, (2008) §173.
198. Republic of Kenya National Assembly, Standing Orders, (2008) §§ 187(2)-(3),
188(2)-(3).
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of the committee is chosen from an opposition party.199 For example, the
head of the official opposition party usually chairs the important Public
Accounts Committee. 200 While this practice enhances the impartiality
and legitimacy of the work of the committees, it should be noted that
political parties typically use appointments to committees to reward
loyalty, which means that committees will not necessarily consist of the
most competent legislators. 201
How, then, have legislators exercised their powers to make policies
and laws, and hold the executive to account? In the recent past, the
legislature has arguably been unduly influenced by special interest
groups in exercising its lawmaking power, as the enactment of the
Tobacco Control Act of 2007 illustrates. 202 Furthermore, the legislature
has not only enacted unconstitutional laws (such as the Constituency
Development Fund Act),203 but has also failed to amend laws that have
been declared unconstitutional (such as the Kenya Roads Board Act).204
These examples demonstrate that the legislature is not only prone to
the undue influence of special interest groups, but may also be abusing
its collective power.
While it is to be expected that different interest groups will
legitimately lobby the legislature to enact favorable policies and laws,
there should be mechanisms to ensure that interest groups seeking
specific legislative outcomes do not subvert the public interest. Such
mechanisms include those that regulate lobbying, conflicts of interest,
misconduct, and even corruption in the legislature. In Kenya, an
attempt has been made to establish such mechanisms, as exemplified by
the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act. 205 The primary
purpose of the Act is to codify the convention of parliamentary privilege,
which guarantees legislators the independence and freedom of speech
necessary to effectively perform their duties of "honest, unbiased and
impartial examination and inquiry and criticism."206 Thus, according to
this Act, "[n]o civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted against
any member for words spoken before, or written in a report to, the
199. World Bank, Understanding the Evolving Role of the Kenya National Assembly in
Economic Governance in Kenya: An Assessment of Opportunities for Building Capacity of
the Tenth Parliament and Beyond, $ 78, Report No. 45924-KE (May 2008) (on file with
author).
200. Id.
201. Id. 96.
202. Tobacco Control Act, No. 4 (2007) (Kenya).
203. Constituencies Development Fund Act, (2003) Cap. 10 (Kenya).
204. Kenya Roads Board Act, (1999) Cap. 408.
205. The National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, (1952) Cap. 6 (Kenya).
206. Graham Zellick, Bribery of Members of Parliament and the Criminal Law, 1979
PUB. LAw 31, 43.
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Assembly or a committee, or by reason of any matter or thing brought
by him therein by petition, Bill, resolution, motion or otherwise."207
Because these privileges can be abused, the Act also empowers the
speaker to "issue directions in the form of a Code of Conduct regulating
the conduct of members of the Assembly whilst within the precincts of
the Assembly other than the Chamber."208 These powers of the speaker
are exercised through the Committee of Privileges, which is empowered
to inquire into allegations of breaches of the Code of Conduct. 209 The
conduct of legislators within the debating chamber is also regulated by
the standing orders. 210
In general, the conduct of legislators outside the debating chamber
or the precincts of the legislature is not regulated. In particular, the
absence of proper regulation has meant that legislators can serve on
committees "even though their membership would entail a conflict of
interest-either because they face allegations of corruption, are
allegedly allied to corruption cartels, or have commercial interests that
are overseen by these committees."211 It should be noted, however, that
the legislature's new standing orders now provide that when an adverse
recommendation has been made against a legislator in a committee
report that has been adopted by the House, that legislator is ineligible
for election as chairperson or vice chairperson of any committee. 212 This
is the context in which the Tobacco Control Act was enacted. Since the
late 1990s, the Kenyan government has attempted to regulate the sale,
marketing, and consumption of tobacco products, with the aim of
implementing the World Health Organization's Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control. 213 However, tobacco companies saw these attempts
as a threat to the profitability of their businesses and therefore lobbied
against the enactment of any adverse legislation. 214 A bill introduced in
the legislature in 1999 did not make any progress until 2004, thanks in
large part to the resistance of the tobacco lobby. 215 When the bill was
reintroduced in the legislature in 2004, the tobacco lobby organized a
207. The National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, (1952) Cap. 6 § 4 (Kenya).
208. Id. § 9 (emphasis added).
209. Id. § 10(4).
210. See Republic of Kenya National Assembly, Standing Orders, (2008) § 97.
211. World Bank, supra note 199, 1 81.
212. Republic of Kenya National Assembly, Standing Orders, (2008) § 162(2).
213. Preeti Patel et al., "The Law Was Actually Drafted by Us but the Government Is to
Be Congratulated on Its Wise Actions'" British American Tobacco and Public Policy in
Kenya, 16 TOBACCO CONTROL el, e2 (2007).
214. Ngumbao Kithi, Ms Mix Tobacco Bill Talks with Pleasure, DAILY NATION
(Nairobi), Nov. 22, 2004.
215. See Dagi Kimanike, New Anti-Tobacco Bill to Hit Industry Hard, EAST AFRICAN
(Nairobi), Oct. 5, 1999.
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retreat for more than forty legislators at which it prevailed upon them
to make certain desired changes to the bill.216 Reports revealed that the
legislators were each flown to the beach resort that served as the venue
for this meeting, accommodated, and entertained at the expense of the
tobacco lobby. 217 While the tobacco lobby was perfectly entitled to seek
favorable, legislation, this retreat arguably undermined the ability of the
legislators to act free of undue influence. In addition, the retreat
privileged the interests of the tobacco lobby at the expense of other
groups in society who do not have equivalent resources to entertain
legislators. Further, it undermined public confidence in the legislature.
The Kenyan public perceives the legislature as one of the most
corrupt public institutions.218 Indeed, there is a growing perception that
legislators do not serve the public interest and are only motivated by
selfish interests. 219 There are even allegations that legislators have
taken bribes from wealthy politicians to influence the deliberations and
decisions of the legislature. 220 Therefore, it does not seem that salary
increases have necessarily enhanced the independence of legislators.
Additionally, the legislature has been the recipient of capacity-building
initiatives (including enhancing legislators' understanding of technical
issues) that have led to lobbying. For example, the legislature has
established an informal forum, labeled the Parliamentary Initiatives
Network, to facilitate its interactions with various nongovernmental
organizations that support the work of the legislature. 221 Unfortunately,
the criteria for membership of, or the rules of engagement in, this forum
are not clear; the result is that it may be perceived as an instrument for
216. Tom Mosoba & Caroline Mango, MPs Vow to Amend Tobacco Bill Clauses,
STANDARD (Nairobi), Nov. 20, 2004, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200411220
372.html.
217. Mark Agutu, Queries on Lobbying and Retreats, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), Dec. 19,
2004, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200412200679.html.
218. See, e.g., Cyrus Kinyungu, MPs Are Most Corrupt, STANDARD (Nairobi), Dec. 6,
2006, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200612061243.html; Mugo Njeru, MPs in
'Most Corrupt' League, DAILY NATION, Dec. 10, 2005, available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200512100099.html.
219. See, e.g., Martin Mutua & Andrew Teyie, Shame: MPs for Hire, STANDARD
(Nairobi), Nov. 18, 2004, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200411180875.html; Njeri
Rugene, Bribery Rampant in Kenya's Parliament, SUNDAY NATION (Nairobi), May 16,
2009, available at http://africanewsonline.blogspot.com/2009/05/bribery-rampant-
inkenyas-parliament.html; Editorial, Put the Voters' Interests First, DAILY NATION
(Nairobi), Nov. 21, 2004, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200411220395.html.
220. Rugene, supra note 219.
221. The members of the forum are SUNY-Kenya, Institute of Economic Affairs,
International Commission of Jurists-Kenya, Law Society of Kenya, Centre for Governance
& Development, International Federation of Women Lawyers, Institute for Education in
Democracy, Transparency International-Kenya, African Youth Trust, African Centre for
Open Governance, and PLATO Institute.
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special interest groups to promote their agenda in the legislature.
Let us now examine how the legislature has exercised its collective
power with respect to the enactment of the Constituency Development
Fund Act (CDF) and the Kenya Roads Board Act.
It should be noted at the outset that the CDF has noble objectives as
it seeks to enhance the participation of citizens in the initiation and
implementation of development projects at the local level. The problem
is that the CDF violates the separation of powers doctrine in a number
of respects. In particular, it gives individual legislators the executive
power to expend public resources and expects that they will account to
the legislature for such expenditures. Two principal institutions of the
CDF are important in this respect, namely the Constituency
Development Committee (CDC) and the Constituency Fund Committee
(CFC).222 The CDC is arguably the most critical organ of the CDF; the
idea of devolution 223 that informs the CDF initiative would not be
realized without it. Its main function is to deliberate projects proposed
from all the locations (or districts) of the constituency and then
determine which projects should be given priority.224 The CDF requires
the establishment of a CDC in every constituency.225 This critical organ,
whose functions are executive in nature, is constituted, convened, and
chaired by a member of parliament. 226 While the CDF attempts to
regulate what kind of persons can serve as members of the CDC, the
chair ultimately has the prerogative to appoint members of his or her
choosing. 227 In addition, the CDF gives legislators the power to identify
the projects which are to be funded by the CDF,228 therefore making the
legislator a grand political patron at the local level.
The CFC functions as an oversight body. It is established as a select
committee of the legislature and consists of "a chairman and not more
than ten other [legislators] who are not Ministers or Assistant Ministers
of Government."229 Its functions include overseeing the policy
framework, the legislative framework, and the implementation of the
CDF.230 Legislators audit their own work under the CDF and answer to
themselves through the CFC.
In practice, legislators have not always been transparent in
exercising their powers under the CDF. Additionally, districts opposed
222. Constituencies Development Fund Act, (2003) Cap. 10 §§ 23, 27 (Kenya).
223. Id. § 23(4).
224. See id.
225. Id. § 23(1).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. § 12(1).
229. Id. § 27(1).
230. Id. § 27(4)(d), (e).
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to the legislators tend to be bypassed and therefore may not benefit
from the funds.231 Subsequently, the CDF may therefore be enhancing
subethnic, regional, and class differences.232 Cases of misappropriation
of funds and poor implementation of projects have also been reported,233
proving that it is unrealistic to expect that legislators will objectively
oversee their own actions. The limitations of the CDF are perhaps best
captured by a commentator, writing that "[t]he scenario presented by
the Act whereby the legislator makes a law . . . , participates in
implementing the law . . and then accounts for the expenditure to
Parliament (in this case to himself) throws democratic accountability
overboard."234
The judiciary had occasion to review the CDF in the case of Oyoo v.
Syongo, where the applicants complained of inequitable distribution of
the funds allocated to the Gwasi Constituency. 235 The court noted that
"there is no clear mechanism in the Act to control abuse or excessive use
of authority by the sitting member of [P]arliament under the powers
given to him under section 23 of [t]he Act."236 In response to public
outcry, the legislature made some changes to the CDF in 2007, but
these changes do not address concerns about the separation of powers
and do not significantly alter the provisions of the CDF.237
The Kenya Roads Board Act (Roads Act) provides the second
illustration. It establishes a board to oversee the maintenance,
rehabilitation, and development of the nation's roads.238 More
specifically for present purposes, the Roads Act establishes a
Constituency Roads Committee (CRC) for every district.239 The Roads
Act incorporated all the legislators from the district members into this
government agency. 240 Shortly after this law was enacted, a citizen
challenged its constitutionality in the case of Republic v. Kenya Roads
Board.241 In this case, the applicant asked the court to stop the
implementation of the Roads Act, and to declare it unconstitutional
because it gave legislators the power to both enact and enforce law. 242
231. KENYA PRIVATE SECTOR ALLIANCE, WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE CONSTITUENCY
DEVELOPMENT FUND 4-5 (2006) (on file with author).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 22.
235. Oyoo v. Syongo, (2005) e.K.L.R. 1, 3 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
236. Id. at 5.
237. Constituency Development Fund (Amendment) Act, (2007) (Kenya).
238. Kenya Roads Board Act, (1999) Cap. 408 § 6(1).
239. Id. § 17(1).
240. See id. § 17(2)(b).
241. See Republic v. Kenya Roads Board, (2001) e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
242. Id. at 2.
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The court agreed, observing that "it would be against the
constitutional principle of separation of powers for [legislators] to take
part in actual spending, then submit their annual estimates to
themselves in [P]arliament for approval, then query the spending
themselves through the Public Accounts Committee or the Public
Investment Committee."243 However, the legislature was unmoved and
this illegality still persists to date. The failure to amend such laws may
be contributing to public perceptions that legislators are greedy, selfish,
and unruly.244
Based on the foregoing account, it is clear that the legislature often
exercises its power in an arbitrary manner. This is in part because the
legal order does not circumscribe the power of legislators to dismiss the
speaker, the power of the PaSC to dismiss the clerk, or the collective
power of the legislators. As a result, the legislature is becoming
increasingly unaccountable for the exercise of its powers.
C. Organization, Exercise, and Accountability of Judicial Power
Unlike the legislature, which has gained considerable autonomy
from the executive, the judiciary remains vulnerable to manipulation.
At the same time, the Chief Justice, who is the head of the judiciary,
enjoys immense power. The powers of the President and the Chief
Justice have been exercised in ways that undermine the institutional
autonomy of the judiciary and the decisional independence of judicial
officers, respectively. As a result, judicial officers are not only insecure
in their positions, but may also become enablers of corruption, as the
decision of the High Court in Republic v. Judicial Commission of
Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair ex parte George Saitoti (Saitoti)
demonstrates. 245
The constitutional amendments of the 1960s, which sought to
enhance the powers of the President, weakened the judiciary. On the
basis that an impartial and independent judiciary would be required if
the rule of law were to thrive in Kenya, section 184 of the Independence
Constitution established a Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to
regulate matters such as judicial appointments and disciplinary actions.
The membership of the JSC is comprised of the Chief Justice (as
243. Id. at 30-31.
244. See Marc Lacey, Kenyan Parliament Unites, for More Money, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2006),
http//www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/world/africa/22iht-kenya.htnil?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
245. See Republic v. Judicial Comm'n of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair, (2006)
e.K.L.R. 1, 3-4 (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (noting, in the recitation of the errors of fact, the
unfairness that would have been served had the original decision of the commission
stood).
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chairman), two judges nominated by the governor-general (acting in
consultation with the Chief Justice), and two members of the PSC
nominated by the governor-general acting in consultation with the
chairman of the PSC. Under section 172 of this constitution, the Chief
Justice is appointed by the governor-general, acting in accordance with
the advice of the prime minister, while other judges were appointed by
the governor-general acting in accordance with the advice of the JSC.
Judges could only be removed from office for inability to perform
functions or misbehavior, a determination made by an impartial
tribunal appointed by the governor-general with the possibility of
appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England,
whose decision the governor-general would act upon.246 The JSC was
also given the power to appoint other judicial officers, such as
magistrates.
Following the constitutional amendments, the power to appoint the
Chief Justice was transferred to the President, who was no longer
required to consult with anyone. 24 7 In addition, while the President was
now required to consult the JSC in appointing judges, little if any
consultation occurred in practice. 248 The President then appointed all
the members of the JSC-the Chief Justice (who is the chairman), the
attorney general, two judges (one from the High Court and the other
from the Court of Appeal), and the chairman of the PSC.249 The
functions of the JSC were to appoint, discipline, and dismiss
magistrates, the registrar or deputy registrar of the High Court (who
are also the main administrative officers), and all other paralegal
officers. 250 In practice, however, the JSC delegated all these powers to
the Chief Justice. 251
The system for appointing judges was open to abuse because it
established no standards or criteria for vetting candidates. A task force
established to examine the question of judicial reform noted that "[t]he
process through which candidates for appointment are currently
identified and vetted by the JSC is neither transparent, nor based on
any publicly known or measurable criteria" and is certainly not
246. G. Kamau Kuria and J.B. Ojwang, Judges and the Rule of Law in the Framework of
Politics: The Kenya Case, 1979 PUB. L. 254, 267.
247. CONSTITUTION, art. 61(1) (1963) (Kenya).
248. Id. art. 61(2).
249. Id. art. 68(1).
250. Id. art. 69.
251. Interview with judges, in Nairobi, Kenya (Aug. 2009) [hereinafter Nairobi
Interview].
377
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1
competitive.252 Accordingly, the individuals who have become judicial
officers have not necessarily been the most deserving. Even lawyers
with disciplinary proceedings pending before the Law Society have been
appointed as judges. Arguably, such judicial officers are likely to
perceive it to be in their best interest to protect the interests, and even
misdeeds, of the appointing authority. Furthermore, section 61 of the
Independence Constitution (as amended) gave the President the power
to appoint judges in an acting capacity. Again, this power enabled the
executive to control the judiciary to the detriment of judicial
independence, proving that judges were not insulated from external
influences.
With respect to the removal of judges, section 62 of the
Independence Constitution provided that the Chief Justice and other
judges could be dismissed by the President-for inability to perform the
functions of their office or for misbehavior-if an impartial tribunal
recommended their removal. Unfortunately, it failed to establish due
process mechanisms to ensure that the process of removal-including
the exercise of the power to recommend the establishment of a
tribunal-was transparent, impartial, and fair. In these circumstances,
the threat of removal then operated as the proverbial sword of
Damocles, in the sense that judicial officers never knew when it might
strike.253
In addition, it should be noted that the Chief Justice wielded
immense power that could threaten the decisional independence of
judges. For a long time, the judiciary was treated as a branch of the
Public Service. This status changed in the early 1990s when the
judiciary was unlinked from the Public Service and placed under the
charge of the Chief Justice, thereby enhancing his power. As the head of
the judiciary, the Chief Justice possessed wide-ranging but unregulated
powers, including determining which judges heard what cases and
where litigants could file their cases, supervising and disciplining
judicial officers, allocating office space and housing, transporting
judicial officers, transferring judicial officers from one geographic
station to another, and initiating the process of removing judges. 254
Because the exercise of these powers was not circumscribed, they could
252. FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUD. REFORMS 24 (2010), available at
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Final Report of the Task Force on Judicial
Reforms.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL REFORM REPORT].
253. Thus the International Commission of Jurists observes that "[t]he possibility that
they could be next in line to be publicly castigated and removed from office without due
process has lowered the general esprit de corps of the judiciary as a whole." INT'L COMM'N
OF JURISTS [ICJ], KENYA: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, CORRUPTION AND REFORM 16 (2005).
254. See, e.g., JUDICIAL REFORM REPORT, supra note 252, at 61-62.
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be abused to the detriment of judicial independence and accountability.
Thus, judges confronted with these powers may have been inclined to do
the bidding of the Chief Justice.
In addition, the arbitrary powers of the Chief Justice were enhanced
by the Public Officer Ethics Act. 255 Section 5 of the Act requires public
institutions to establish codes of conduct and ethics. In the case of the
judiciary, rule 4 of the Judicial Service Code of Conduct and Ethics
established under the Act requires judicial officers "having information
establishing a likelihood that another judicial officer has violated this
Code or reflecting the other judicial officer's lack of fitness to hold
judicial office shall inform the Chief Justice."256 Rule 14(1) of the Code
also prohibits judicial officers from making "public statements on
matters affecting Government programmes or policies of the Judicial
Service without the specific authority of the Chief Justice." Yet the Code
fails to specify how the Chief Justice should act when a judicial officer
violates it. Arguably, it therefore gives the Chief Justice an additional
instrument with which to intimidate judicial officers.
The so-called "radical surgery" 25 7 of the judiciary that saw the
suspension, and then dismissal, of some twenty judges on allegations of
corruption in 2003 provides a good example of how the Chief Justice
exercises his immense powers. In response to allegations of corruption
in the judiciary, the new Chief Justice appointed an Integrity and Anti-
Corruption Committee, which was to be headed by Justice Aaron
Ringera, then judge of the High Court. 258 The Ringera Committee's
mandate was to
(i) investigate and report on the magnitude of corruption in
the Judiciary;
(ii) identify the nature, forms and causes of corruption;
(iii) find out the level of bribery in monetary terms;
(iv) report on the impact of corruption in the performance of
the Judiciary;
255. Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 (Kenya).
256. JUD. SERV. COMM'N, L.N. 50/2003, JUDICIAL SERVICE CODE OF CONDUCT AND
ETHICS (2005) (Kenya).
257. ICJ, supra note 253, at 20.
258. REPORT OF THE INTEGRITY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY OF
KENYA, at I (2003), available at http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/Reports/Government/
RingeraReport.pdf.
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(v) identify corrupt members of the Judiciary and recommend
disciplinary or other measures against them;
(vi) recommend strategies for the detention and prevention
of corruption in the Judiciary; and
(vii) address any other related matters. 259
The Ringera Committee reported back to the Chief Justice six
months later and published in the popular media a list of the judges and
magistrates it thought had engaged in corruption.260 The Chief Justice
then advised the affected judges and magistrates to resign within two
weeks or be suspended without pay and face tribunals of inquiry.
There are two principal problems with how the Chief Justice
exercised his powers during the "radical surgery." First, the accused
judges and magistrates were publicly labeled as corrupt without being
informed of the charges against them. 261 The public naming of the
allegedly corrupt judges and magistrates prejudiced the outcome of any
subsequent judicial proceedings. As a result, the affected judges and
magistrates were condemned well before the commencement of the
subsequent tribunals of inquiry. Second, the Chief Justice selected
sitting judges to serve on the Ringera Committee. In effect, these judges
were now judging their colleagues. Indeed, there were allegations that
the members of the Ringera Committee "acted vindictively against their
colleagues." 262 Furthermore, the criteria the Chief Justice used to select
the members of the Committee is not clear. Once appointed to this
committee, the judges could not be expected to investigate themselves.
This raises the question as to who would have investigated them,
assuming that there were an objective attempt to investigate corruption
in the judiciary as a whole.
Judicial officers may also issue decisions that undermine public
confidence in the judiciary, as illustrated by the Saitoti case. The
applicant in this case, George Saitoti, was the Minister for Finance
when the government approved Goldenberg's creative scheme in the
early 1990s. Once word got out that Goldenberg had swindled the
259. Id. § 1:2:1.
260. See, e.g., Judges Plot Fightback over Justice Ringera's 'List of Shame, NATION
(Nairobi), Oct. 8, 2003.
261. ICJ, supra note 253, at 19.
262. Joyce Manyasi, Strengthening Democratic Process in the Kenyan Judiciary: Best
Practices, Lessons Learnt and Emerging Trends, in JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT: JUDICIAL
REFORM IN KENYA 25, 39 (Kenyan Section of the Int'l Comm'n, Judiciary Watch Ser. No. 3,
Philip Kichana ed., 2005).
380
ABUSE OF POWER AND CORRUPTION IN KENYA
government, a huge outcry followed and several initiatives were
launched to establish how Goldenberg had committed this crime. These
initiatives included investigations by committees of Parliament,
criminal investigations, and public as well as private attempts to
prosecute the perpetrators of the fraud. Shortly after the National
Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government assumed office after having won
the 2002 general elections, President Mwai Kibaki established a
commission of inquiry to investigate the Goldenberg scandal.263 The
commission was headed by Justice Samuel Bosire, a judge of the Court
of Appeal, and was accordingly dubbed the "Bosire Commission."264
Saitoti was unhappy with the report of the Bosire Commission, as it
portrayed him unfavorably. Among other things, the Bosire Commission
reported that Saitoti "knowingly and illegally allowed [Goldenberg] an
enhanced rate of export compensation contrary to the provisions of the
Local Manufacturers (Export Compensation) Act. Besides, it was clearly
an abuse of his powers as Minister not to have subjected this application
to technical evaluation as he did others." 265 Saitoti quickly sought
judicial review orders in the High Court to quash "the findings, remarks
and decisions" of the Bosire Commission and to prohibit the attorney
general from bringing criminal charges against him. 266 The court
obliged, finding that the Bosire Commission erred by purporting to
review a decision of Parliament and that Saitoti had acted according to
the law. The court also noted that Saitoti could not be accorded a fair
trial under the circumstances. 267
The reasoning of the court merits some examination. First, the court
considered the National Assembly Public Accounts Committee's (PAC)
investigation of the Goldenberg affair and concluded that, in 1995, "the
Government followed normal procedures of approval in granting the
request by Goldenberg International Ltd."268 Moreover, the court noted
that Parliament had unanimously adopted this report of the PAC. 269
The court then made reference to section 12 of the National Assembly
(Powers and Privileges) Act, which provides that "[nlo proceedings or
decision of the Assembly or the committee of privileges acting in
accordance with this Act shall be questioned in any court."270 From this
analysis, the court concluded that the Bosire Commission did not have
263. GOLDENBERG AFFAIR, supra note 118, 1 1.
264. See id.
265. Id. J 547.
266. Republic v. Judicial Comm'n of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair, (2006) e.K.L.R.
1, 2 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
267. Id. at 53.
268. Id. at 33.
269. Id. at 52.
270. Id. at 35.
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the power to question the decisions of Parliament or committees
thereof.271 According to the court, once the legislature made a policy
decision that the approvals given to Goldenberg were procedural, this
decision could not thereafter be questioned by a court of law, let alone
an inferior tribunal such as a commission of inquiry.
Second, the court held that, should criminal charges be brought
against Saitoti, he would not be able to receive a fair trial because "the
comments made in Parliament and by other public officers have already
prejudiced the principles of a fair trial," and because the errors and
breaches of law by the Bosire Commission "have been widely and
serially publicized nationally as truth and law in the past three
years."272 The court also reasoned that, because many years had passed
without any criminal charges being brought against Saitoti, his
constitutional right to a fair trial within a reasonable time would be
violated were charges now filed. 273 Specifically, the court reasoned:
The Applicant is a member of Parliament who in making
his contribution in Parliament defended himself on the
floor of the August House. Historically Parliaments were
in certain jurisdictions called the High Court of
Parliament in that as regards matters within their
jurisdiction they were regarded as final and could not be
reopened elsewhere. There is a semblance of double
jeopardy.274
Accordingly, the court reasoned that because Saitoti had already been
tried in the legislature, it would amount to double jeopardy if he were to
be tried in a court of law. Quite apart from the fact that the court
stretched the notion of double jeopardy beyond rational limits in its
reasoning, the idea that an inquiry by the legislature should constitute
a barrier to judicial inquiry is absurd. In any case, the absence of speedy
investigations and prosecutions in the Goldenberg affair is arguably
attributable to deliberate inaction by the executive. 275 The idea of a fair
trial within a reasonable time should therefore be examined in context,
and a court seized of the matter ought to inquire into the circumstances
that may have contributed to the failure to institute criminal charges in
a timely manner.
The Saitoti decision sets a bad precedent because it renders the
271. Id. at 40.
272. Id. at 50.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 49.
275. See GOLDENBERG AFFAIR, supra note 118, 757-784.
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report of the Bosire Commission worthless. In all likelihood, any person
now adversely mentioned in the report of a commission of inquiry will
rush to court,276 and when such a person obtains favorable orders, it
means that no court of law will try them for any offense they may have
committed. This is precisely what happened in the case of Kotut V.
Bosire.277 The decision in Saitoti will therefore make it even harder for
the country to fight corruption. 278 The Saitoti and Kotut decisions also
reinforce public perceptions that the courts make political rather than
legal decisions so as to protect the interests of the rich and powerful.
The fact that the two decisions are not easy to rationalize legally also
undermines the authority of the judiciary as a legitimate forum for the
resolution of political and other disputes.
Thus in the case of the judiciary, the failure to regulate the powers
of appointment of the President and the Chief Justice, and the
administrative powers of the latter, may have aided corruption and
undermined the legitimacy of the judiciary.
III. WILL THE NEW CONSTITUTION ENHANCE GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY?
Whether the new constitution will enhance accountability depends
on the extent to which it addresses the problem of arbitrary power.
Therefore, the key question is whether it establishes principles and
mechanisms that will circumscribe the exercise of power in all three
branches of government.
The new constitution adopts a presidential system of government.
Article 130 establishes an executive cabinet consisting of a President,
deputy president, and cabinet secretaries. 279 Article 148 provides that
the deputy president shall be nominated by the President-elect and
276. It should be noted that in another case the court declined to issue the orders of
certiorari and prohibition, and reasoned that the public interest demanded that the issues
raised by the applicant "should be determined in a proper trial, and should not be stayed
by the court merely because they relate to issues raised 4, 8, 12 or more years ago."
Koinange v. Comm'n of Inquiry into Goldenberg Comm'n, (2006) e.K.L.R. 1, 14 (H.C.K)
(Kenya).
277. Kotut v. Comm'n of Inquiry into Goldenberg Comm'n, (2008) e.KL.R. 1, 52-53
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).; see also Jillo Kadida, Is This the End of the Goldenberg Cases?, DAILY
NATION (Nov. 21, 2008, 10:35 PM), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-11056/493548/-Itm3l7h/-
/index.html (reporting the court's decision that the attorney general could not prosecute
former Cental Bank Governor Eric Kotut based on the findings of an investigative
commission); Judy Ogutu, Goldenberg: Court Also Frees Kotut, STANDARD (Nov. 22, 2008),
http://www.standardmedia.co.kelarchives/InsidePage.php?id=1143999884&cid=4&.
278. See Paul M. Mwangi, Why Saitoti Ruling is Dangerous for Future of Justice in
Kenya, SUNDAY NATION (Nairobi), Aug. 6, 2006.
279. CONSTITUTION, art. 130(1) (2010) (Kenya).
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declared as such by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission.280 The cabinet secretaries, who shall not be legislators, are
appointed by the President and subject to the approval of the National
Assembly, one of the two houses that make up the legislature. 281 The
President also appoints principal secretaries (formerly permanent
secretaries), again subject to the approval of the National Assembly. 282
The new constitution does not specify the qualifications that cabinet
secretaries or principal secretaries must satisfy, with the result that
these powers of appointment are not fettered unduly, save that Article
152 caps the number of cabinet secretaries at twenty-two. 283
Accordingly, it curtails a power that previous presidents have used as a
resource to dispense political patronage and subvert the democratic
process by, for example, depleting the ranks of the opposition.
Cabinet secretaries may be dismissed under two circumstances. In
the first instance, Article 154 allows for their dismissal by the President
without the approval of the National Assembly. 284 Second, Article 152
imposes an obligation on the President to dismiss a cabinet secretary
where a majority of the members of the National Assembly adopts a
resolution based on the recommendations of a select committee. 285 This
provision seals a loophole that kept ministers with whom the legislature
has lost confidence in office.
The role that the cabinet will play in the exercise of executive
authority is unclear. Article 131 only provides that the President will
exercise executive authority "with the assistance of the Deputy
President and Cabinet Secretaries," without clarifying the forms that
this assistance will take, or whether the President will be obligated to
seek their assistance.286 Furthermore, it is unresolved whether the
President can bypass the cabinet altogether or make decisions affecting
the portfolios of cabinet secretaries without involving or informing
them. In this regard, it therefore seems that there is no marked
departure from the previous constitution to the extent that the
President retains exclusive and unfettered responsibility for the
exercise of executive authority. If there is to be a departure from the
status quo, the President should be obligated to consult and involve the
cabinet in decision making.
Nevertheless, the new constitution makes the cabinet accountable to
280. Id. art. 148(3).
281. Id. arts. 132(2)(a), 152(2)-(3).
282. Id. art. 155(3).
283. Id. art. 152(1)(d).
284. Id. arts. 155(2)(b).
285. Id. art. 152(5)(c), (6)-(10).
286. Id. art. 131(1)(b).
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the legislature. Thus Article 153 requires cabinet secretaries to appear
before committees of the legislature whenever they are summoned and
to provide the legislature with "full and regular" reports concerning
matters under their control.287 In addition, this article facilitates
accountability by requiring that decisions of the cabinet be in writing. 288
With respect to the Public Service, Article 154 establishes the office
of secretary to the cabinet, whose responsibilities include arranging
business, keeping the minutes of the cabinet, and communicating the
decisions of the cabinet to the Public Service. 289 The new constitution
does not establish principles or mechanisms to guide or regulate the
administration of the Public Service or its interaction with the cabinet.
Accordingly, there is nothing in the new constitution to prevent the
President from continuing with the current practice under which the
office of the head of the Public Service and secretary to the cabinet both
direct the affairs of the Public Service. The drafters should have taken
this practice into account and established mechanisms to regulate how
the secretary to the cabinet directs the affairs of the Public Service.
Article 233 establishes a new Public Service Commission, consisting
of a chairperson, vice chairperson, and seven other members appointed
by the President with the approval of the National Assembly. 290 The
functions of this commission are the same as before with the additional
responsibility of hearing and determining appeals in respect of matters
relating to the Public Service from the county governments, which
constitutes one of the mechanisms for devolution.291 Other key functions
of the commission include maintaining discipline in the Public Service;
promoting national values and principles of governance; and
investigating, monitoring, and evaluating the organization,
administration, and personnel practices. Notably, this commission is not
responsible for directing the affairs of the Public Service. Unlike before,
members of the commission can only be removed from office pursuant to
the recommendation of a tribunal established by the President with the
approval of the National Assembly.292
In a bid to protect public officers from intimidation and to give them
security of tenure, Article 236 provides that public officers will not be
victimized or discriminated against for carrying out their duties in
accordance with the law, or "dismissed, removed from office, demoted in
rank or otherwise subjected to disciplinary action without due process of
287. Id. arts. 153(3), (4)(b).
288. Id. art. 153(1).
289. Id. art. 154(3).
290. Id. art. 233(1)-(2).
291. Id. art. 234(2)(i).
292. Id. art. 251(2)-(6).
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law"' 29 3 Therefore, public officers will no longer hold office "during the
pleasure of the President," as section 25 of the old constitution
proclaimed. 294 Accordingly, the new constitution fills a significant
loophole in the framework governing the Public Service, namely that
public officers were not empowered to resist the illegal instructions of
their seniors, ministers, or the President, with the result that they are
often accomplices in grand corruption schemes. As examined earlier,
public officers looking out for the public interest can easily be
intimidated into implementing illegal instructions, which are invariably
verbal. Articles 135 and 153 of the new constitution remedy this
problem by providing that the decisions of the cabinet and the President
must be in writing.295 This will empower public officers to require the
production of written instructions before taking any action. It will be
necessary to align public service regulations, such as the Government
Financial Regulations, with these provisions of the new constitution.
Another significant innovation of the new constitution, contained in
Article 73, is the introduction of principles on leadership and integrity,
which bind all holders of public and state office, including public
officers. 296 In particular, it establishes the principle that the authority
assigned to a "State officer" is a "public trust" that must be exercised in
a manner that is consistent with the purposes and objects of the
constitution. 297 The new constitution therefore views public officers as
the holders of a public trust, who are accountable to the people for the
exercise of the powers delegated to them. This promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the office.
The new constitution also introduces strict rules on conflicts of
interest, which will assist in preventing the abuse of power which so
often leads to corruption. Article 75 imposes a duty on state officers to
"behave, whether in public and official life, in private life, or in
association with other persons, in a manner that avoids any conflict
between personal interests and public or official duties." 298 Article 79
also requires that Parliament enact a law to establish an "independent
ethics and anti-corruption commission."299 This body's main function
will be to ensure compliance with, and enforce, constitutional provisions
on leadership and integrity, including conflicts of interest.300 Among
293. Id. art. 236.
294. CONSTITUTION, art. 25(1) (1963) (Kenya).
295. CONSTITUTION, arts. 135, 153 (2010) (Kenya).
296. Id. art. 73(2).
297. Id. art. 73(1)(a)(1).
298. Id. art. 75(1)(a).
299. Id. art. 79.
300. Id.
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other things, these provisions will prevent state officers from abusing
their power in the process of trying to acquire private property, or
pursuing other private interests. These provisions seal a regulatory gap
that was created when the Duncan Ndegwa Commission of 1970
recommended that public servants should be allowed to own private
property and run businesses. 301 While the Ndegwa Commission
suggested that public servants would only be permitted to do so under
strict conditions, even recommending the establishment of the office of
an ombudsman to investigate and monitor the performance of public
servants, the government did not implement these recommendations. As
a result, the decision to permit public servants to own private property
and run businesses led to widespread abuse of office and corruption.
In the area of criminal justice, the new constitution enhances
objectivity and accountability in investigations and prosecutions. Under
Article 157, the state's powers of prosecution will now be exercised by
the office of Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).302 The attorney
general's primary functions, according to Article 156, will now be to give
legal advice to the government and represent it in legal proceedings. 303
The new constitution notably requires the current attorney general to
vacate office no later than twelve months after it takes effect. 304 This is
a vetting exercise, given that the attorney general is considered to be
"not just complicit in, but absolutely indispensable to, a system which
has institutionalized impunity in Kenya."305 The DPP can only take over
a criminal suit with the permission of the person or authority who
instituted it. In addition, the DPP can only discontinue a prosecution
with the permission of the court. Finally, to preclude the abuse of the
power to prosecute, the new constitution requires that the DPP's
exercise of this power "shall have regard to the public interest, the
interests of the administration of justice and the need to prevent and
avoid abuse of the legal process."306 To facilitate the daily application of
these principles, there is a need for the legislature to enact guidelines
and factors that the DPP should take into account when deciding
whether or not to institute criminal proceedings.
Article 93 of the new constitution establishes a Parliament with two
houses, namely a National Assembly and a Senate.3 07 The National
301. See Odhiambo-Mbai, supra note 73, at 121.
302. CONSTITUTION, art. 157(6) (2010) (Kenya).
303. Id. art. 156(4)(a)-(b).
304. Id. sched. 6 cl. 31(7).
305. Human Rights Council, GAOR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/2/Add.6 (May 26, 2009) (by
Philip Alston).
306. CONSTITUTION, art. 157(11) (2010) (Kenya).
307. Id. art. 93(1).
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Assembly will have primary responsibility for legislation and oversight
of the executive at the national level.308 On the other hand, the Senate is
a .mechanism for devolution.309 Each house of Parliament will be
presided over by a speaker, who shall be an ex officio member as
required by Article 106.31o Unlike the present position where the
speaker is typically appointed from a pool of current legislators, the new
constitution provides that the two speakers will be elected by each
house "from among persons who are qualified to be elected as
[legislators] but are not such members." 311 Among other restrictions,
each speaker may be removed from office if the relevant house "so
resolves by a resolution supported by the votes of at least two-thirds of
its members."312 The two speakers therefore do not enjoy security of
tenure, and may not be able to exercise effective control over the
manner in which legislators exercise their collective powers of making
policies and laws or over the manner in which legislators hold the
executive accountable for its actions.
With respect to the administration of Parliament, Article 127 of the
new constitution establishes a Parliamentary Service and a
Parliamentary Service Commission, consisting of the Speaker of the
National Assembly as the chairperson, seven members nominated by
the party or parties in government and opposition parties, and one man
and one woman who are "experienced in public affairs" and appointed
by Parliament from among persons who are not legislators. 313 For the
first time, persons who are not legislators will sit on this Commission.
However, it is not clear how Parliament will go about nominating them.
Furthermore, the clerk of the Senate also serves as the secretary of this
Commission.314 The main functions of the Commission are to provide
the services and facilities to ensure that Parliament does its work
efficiently and effectively, to constitute offices in the Parliamentary
Service, and to appoint and supervise office holders.315 Presumably, the
Commission will also be responsible for discipline in the Parliamentary
Service.
Each house of Parliament will be headed by a clerk appointed by the
Commission with the approval of the relevant house according to Article
128.316 The clerks do not enjoy security of tenure, and are subject to
308. Id. art. 94(1).
309. Id. art. 95(1).
310. Id. art. 106(1)(a).
311. Id. (emphasis added).
312. Id. art. 106(2)(c).
313. Id. art. 127(2)(a), (c), (d).
314. Id. art. 127(3).
315. Id. art. 127(6)(a)-(b).
316. Id. art. 128(1).
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supervision by the Commission, as they are "offices in =.the
Parliamentary Service."an7
Article 117 of the new constitution provides for the powers,
privileges, and immunities of the legislature, including "freedom of
speech and debate in Parliament."3 18 However, it makes no attempt. to
circumscribe the exercise of these powers. Nevertheless, Article .118
imposes a duty on Parliament to facilitate public participation and
involvement in the business of Parliament and its committees, 3 19 while
Article 119 gives every person the right to petition Parliament "to
consider any matter within its authority."320 Article 104 also gives the
electorate the right to recall the legislator representing their
constituency, and imposes a duty on Parliament to enact legislation that
will establish the grounds and procedures according to which a Member
of Parliament (1VIP) may be recalled. 321 Although these provisions may
constitute useful mechanisms for regulating the collective powers of the
legislature, they will need to be accompanied by mechanisms that
regulate lobbying, conflicts of interest, misconduct, and abuse of power
in Parliament.
The absence of such mechanisms has made legislators vulnerable to
capture by special interests, which jeopardizes the ability of the
legislature to safeguard the public good. It has also brought into
question the legislature's ability to hold the executive accountable
because its committees, which form a critical part of its arsenal of
oversight instruments, often consist of legislators against whom credible
allegations of corruption have been made, and who cannot therefore be
expected to be genuine champions of the public interest. The provisions
of the new constitution dealing with leadership and integrity, including
those governing conflicts of interest, therefore provide a much-needed
framework for regulating the conduct of legislators.
Finally, in the case of the judiciary, the failure to regulate the
President and Chief Justice's powers of appointment and dismissal and
the administrative powers of the latter, often aid corruption and
undermine the legitimacy of the judiciary. These powers have been
exercised in ways that undermine the institutional autonomy of the
judiciary and the decisional independence of judicial officers,
respectively.
How, then, does the new constitution enhance the independence and
accountability of the judiciary? First, it disperses judicial authority.
317. Id. art. 128(2).
318. Id. art. 117(1).
319. Id. art. 118(1)(b).
320. Id. art. 119(1).
321. Id. art. 104.
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Although the Chief Justice is still the head of the judiciary, the new
constitution establishes three superior courts (in addition to various
subordinate courts): the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the
High Court.322 It also establishes the offices of deputy Chief Justice (as
the deputy head of the judiciary), who will be the judiciary's chief
administrator and accounting officer pursuant to Article 161,323 and
chief registrar of the judiciary who will administer the judiciary fund
established by Article 173 to enhance the financial autonomy of the
judiciary.324 It further provides that the Chief Justice will preside over
the Supreme Court, while the Court of Appeal and the High Court will
be presided over by a judge elected by the judges of these courts from
among themselves pursuant to Article 164.325
Second, Article 166 of the new constitution gives the judiciary
autonomy from the executive. It provides that the President will now
appoint the Chief Justice and judges of the superior courts subject to the
recommendations of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and the
approval of the National Assembly.326 As in the case of the new PSC, the
new constitution broadens the membership of the JSC, which now
includes representatives of subordinate courts and practicing lawyers. 327
Further, it empowers the President to appoint one man and one woman
who are not lawyers to "represent the public" in the Commission.328
Third, Article 168 of the new constitution circumscribes the power to
dismiss judges. Unlike before, the process of removal of the Chief
Justice and judges will now be initiated by the JSC. Acting on its own
motion, or on the petition of "any person," this Commission is required
to hold a hearing regarding the affected judge and to send the petition
to the President only when there are legitimate grounds for removal.329
Upon receiving the petition, the President is then required to establish a
tribunal to inquire into the matter.330 The new constitution therefore
introduces due process and certainty in the exercise of the power to
dismiss judges and is therefore likely to enhance security of tenure and
independence of judges.
Another notable feature of the new constitution is that it rids the
judiciary of regime actors and provides a framework for the removal of
"unsuitable" judges. First, it provides that the Chief Justice shall vacate
322. Id. arts. 163-165.
323. Id. art. 161(2)(b).
324. Id. art. 173(1).
325. Id. arts. 163(1)(a), 164(2), 165(2).
326. Id. art. 166(1)(a).
327. Id. art 171(2)(d), (f).
328. Id. art. 171(2)(h).
329. Id. art. 168(2)-(4).
330. Id. art. 168(5).
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office within six months after it takes effect.3 31 Secondly, within one
year of the constitution taking effect, Parliament must enact a law
establishing mechanisms and procedures for vetting the suitability of all
judges and magistrates, ensuring they continue to serve in accordance
with the values and principles established in Articles 10 and 159.332
While these vetting provisions are commendable, care should be taken
to ensure that they do not facilitate witch hunting, a scenario that is
plausible given the vagueness of some of the principles established in
these articles. For example, a principle such as "patriotism" can be
interpreted in different ways, and it would fly in the face of reason or
even fairness to dismiss judges on the ground that they have not been
patriotic. Additionally, it is debatable whether it would be fair to
dismiss judges on the ground that they have not administered justice
with due regard to procedural technicalities or on the ground that they
have delayed justice in a legal system in which legal procedures lend
themselves to such abuses. The need for fairness and due process in the
implementation of these provisions is made even more urgent by the
fact that the removal, or the process leading to the removal, of judges
under these provisions "shall not be subject to question in, or review by,
any court."333 In this regard, Kenya could learn from the experience of
other countries, where the performance or competence of judges is
assessed by reference to criteria that facilitate objective analysis, such
as "willful misconduct" in office, integrity, and conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice, or conduct that brings the judicial office (or
judiciary) into disrepute. 334
A major weakness of the new constitution relates to the
appointment of public officers. In many instances, it requires the
President to nominate officers (such as the attorney general, the
director of public prosecutions, cabinet secretaries, principal secretaries,
the Chief Justice, and other judges) for approval by Parliament without
establishing criteria for determining the suitability of individuals for
these offices. The new constitution assumes that members of Parliament
will actually play their role and vet nominees for public office. However,
the absence of nomination criteria encourages "horse-trading" among
the key political parties, who are thus likely to enter a pact in which the
331. Id. sched. 6 cl. 24(1).
332. Id. sched. 6 cl. 23(1).
333. Id. sched. 6 cl. 23(2).
334. See generally Stanley Anderson, Judicial Accountability: Scandinavia, California
& the U.S.A., 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 393 (1980) (discussing the worldwide trend towards
increasing judicial accountability); Jean E. Dubofsky, Judicial Performance Review: A
Balance Between Judicial Independence and Public Accountability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
315 (2007) (explaining that judicial performance commissions established in Colorado may
encroach on judicial independence).
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parties agree not to question the suitability of one another's candidates
for office. This would greatly undermine the new constitution's objective
of vesting Kenyan professional leaders with integrity. There is thus a
need to enact a law establishing suitable nomination and appointment
criteria.
IV. REALIZING THE NEW CONSTITUTION
The new constitution establishes principles and mechanisms that
will enhance government accountability. However, these gains will be
derailed unless the statutory order is transformed to conform to the
values and principles of the constitution. As examined previously, many
of the arbitrary powers of government are derived from the statutory
order. Democratization initiatives in Africa have tended to concentrate
on enhancing ballot-box democracy and enacting new constitutions.
While these reforms are important, they have failed to grasp the fact
that much of the power of government is exercised by the President
through bureaucrats, who regulate the daily lives of citizens and
therefore effectively exercise broad delegated powers. In the course of
exercising their duties, bureaucrats do not simply implement laws and
regulations, but often interpret them. For example, such laws and
regulations often give bureaucrats broad discretion. In practice, the
breadth and lack of effective regulation of these powers means that the
bureaucrats do as they wish for the most part, irrespective of
constitutional prescriptions. In addition, judicial review is not an
adequate tool for regulating these routine powers since only a few cases
will come to the attention of the courts. There is still a need to address
the abuse of power by officials at the most basic levels of public
administration, such as police constables, clerks at the lands office,
municipal clerks, and tax assessors.3 35
In terms of making these low-level officials accountable, a key
challenge relates to how the imperial and authoritarian statutory order
can be transformed so that it conforms to the demands of
constitutionalism. The new constitution addresses this problem by
providing, "[a]1 law in force immediately before the effective date
continues in force and shall be construed with the alterations,
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions necessary to bring it into
conformity with this Constitution."3 36 In effect, the new constitution
gives public administrators and other government officers considerable
335. See H. Kwasi Prempeh, Africa's "Constitutionalism Revival": False Start or New
Dawn?, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 469, 500 (2007).
336. CONSTITUTION, sched. 6 cl. 7(1) (2010) (Kenya).
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latitude in deciding how they will interpret existing statutory laws.
Given the limitations of judicial review, this latitude may have the
effect that public administrators will continue to be "the real source of
the laws governing society's routine social and economic activity."83 7 In
other words, the law will continue to be what the public administrator
or police officer declares it to be. In addition, the new constitution has
not addressed the need to review the bylaws, regulations, codes of
conduct, and governance practices that make up the statutory order and
constitute the sources of power for public administrators. These sources
of power now need to be brought into conformity with the new
constitution.
The new constitution also mandates the development of legislation
and administrative procedures required for implementation, with the
effect that some of the repressive statutory laws may or may not be
repealed. The Sixth Schedule establishes a Commission for the
Implementation of the Constitution, which will work together with the
attorney general and the Constitutional Implementation Oversight
Committee (a select committee of Parliament) to enact the laws that
need to be enacted, which are set out in the Fifth Schedule. 338 Without a
doubt, the enactment of these laws will enhance the accountability of
the legal order. However, as much of the power of government resides in
the statutory order, and political regimes will want to retain as much
power as possible, the process of enacting laws to facilitate the
realization of these constitutional principles and mechanisms will be
highly contentious. For this reason, the work of the Commission for the
Implementation of the Constitution needs to be participatory and
accountable.
The establishment of a credible regime of administrative law also
offers a useful avenue for democratizing the exercise of power. While
constitutional law sets out the broad powers of the executive and other
branches of government, administrative law plays the important role of
ensuring that public agencies and public officers do not abuse the
discretionary powers that are given to them by statutes. It is therefore a
critical tool for the realization of limited government that adheres to the
rule of law ideal. Administrative law performs its role by establishing
democratic principles and procedures that regulate the exercise of
power, such as transparency and procedural fairness. It also plays a
critical role in fostering participation by interested parties in the
decision-making processes of government.
In this regard, the provisions of the new constitution on fair
337. Prempeh, supra note 335, at 498.
338. CONSTITUTION, sched. 5, sched. 6 cl. 5(1), (6)(b) (2010) (Kenya).
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administrative action are critical. Article 47 provides, "[e]very person
has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient,
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair."339 It further provides that
every person has "the right to be given written reasons where his or her
right or fundamental freedom has been or is likely to be adversely
affected by administrative action."34 0 The new constitution also imposes
a duty on Parliament to enact a law giving effect to these rights.
This right to fair administrative action may enhance the
participation of the citizenry in, and the accountability of, the exercise of
power. First, it can enhance the rights and expectations of citizens in
governmental processes, who would then be in a better position to
demand responsive administrative action. Second, it can enhance the
accountability of public officers, who are likely to perform better because
they know that their actions are being scrutinized by the citizenry.
But the citizenry can only take advantage of the values, principles,
and mechanisms established by the new constitution if they are
sufficiently empowered. In this respect, legal empowerment initiatives
are crucial. Such initiatives would include legal literacy training,
increased availability of legal assistance, and public interest litigation.
In particular, the capacities of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups
must be enhanced by the State and nongovernmental organizations so
that they can make better use of the democratic spaces created by the
new constitution.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that abuse of power and corruption in Kenya
can be attributed to the absence of effective regulatory principles and
mechanisms. Typically, the law has granted executive, legislative, and
judicial actors broad power without establishing effective mechanisms
to circumscribe their exercise. The new constitution promises to reduce
abuse of power and corruption, in so far as it establishes much-needed
principles and mechanisms for effective regulation of governmental
power. However, the constitution alone will not enhance government
accountability. This is because much of the power of government is
found in a statutory order that gives executive, legislative, and judicial
actors vast discretionary power, which have often fueled corruption.
Therefore an urgent need arises to align this statutory order with the
values and principles of the new constitution, and to empower citizens
to demand accountability from government.
339. Id. art. 47(1).
340. Id. art. 47(2).
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